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QUESTIONING QUILL
Hayes R. Holderness*
The physical presence rule of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota is under
increasing attack from the "Kill Quill" movement - a consortium of state
tax administrators, industry leaders, and academics opposed to the decision.
The physical presence rule prohibits states from requiring many out-of-state
vendors to collect taxes on goods sold into the states. Though the Kill Quill
movement has succeeded in getting a challenge to the rule before the
Supreme Court, the case for overturning the physical presence rule remains
cloudy.
Technology and the economy have changed in the twenty-five years since
Quill was decided, but are these changes enough to convince the Court to
recalibrate the rule? This article argues that more will be needed; attention
must be drawn to the analytical gaps in the cases endorsing the physical
presence rule. These cases have failed to explain the basis for requiring any
connection between a taxing state and a taxpayer under the Commerce
Clause (under which the physical presence rule originates) and have blended
together the substance ofsales taxes and use taxes for jurisdictional purposes
without clear justification. Through unpacking these issues, the article
exposes principles to guide the development offundamentally sound rules for
sales tax and use tax jurisdiction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"'I want to kill Quill . . . Say it with me: 'Kill Quill, kill Quill."" So
urged former Alabama Revenue Commissioner Julie Magee at a meeting of
tax officials, expressing her clear disdain for the Supreme Court's 1992 Quill
Corporation v. North Dakota ruling, which established that a vendor must
have a physical presence in a state before that state can require the vendor to
collect the state's sales and use taxes. 2 Commissioner Magee is not the only
*Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. My deepest gratitude to Matt
Boch, Rick Handel, Paul Heald, Rick Pomp, Art Rosen, Erin Scharff, Adam Thimmesch, and
the participants at the 2017 Ohio State Moritz College of Law Summer Workshop Series and
the 2017 Mid-Atlantic Junior Faculty Forum for their helpful discussions of and comments on
earlier drafts of this article.
1 Billy Hamilton, It's Almost Time to Upgrade to Version 20.17 (Thank Goodness),
2017 ST. TAX TODAY 2-15 (Jan. 4, 2017).
2 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1992). A use tax is a tax on the
use of a taxable good or service; in current practice, use taxes apply to the use of taxable things
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person unhappy with the Quill decision, and a "Kill Quill" movement has
grown recently to the point where states have enacted legislation and passed
regulations expressly disregarding the Supreme Court's ruling. 3 Whether or
not to "kill Quill" is a major issue: the decision is the reason that many
consumers today are not charged taxes on online purchases; changing Quill's
physical presence rule would impact anyone who shops online.
The Kill Quill movement is symptomatic of rifts within the state and
local tax community as to the appropriate "nexus" standard for state tax
actions, particularly those related to sales and use taxes.4 "Nexus" is a term
of art referring to the connection between a state and a person or thing that
must exist before the U.S. Constitution permits the state to tax the. person or
thing. The growing divide between those supporting Quill's physical
presence nexus rule and those opposed to it threatens to upset the status quo,
as those opposed to the rule seek ways around it and those in support of it
entrench themselves against such actions. Regardless of result, a return to the
issue by the Supreme Court would help settle this volatile landscape. 5
Though the Court has been loath to hear challenges to the physical presence
when sales taxes were not collected when those things were purchased (a common example of
such a situation involves things purchased over the internet). See infra notes 21-24 and
accompanying text.
3 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-1 et seq.; ALA. ADMIN CODE r. 810-6-2-.90.03;
TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1320-05-01-129.
4 Compare, e.g., John A. Swain, Quexit: The Time Has Come, 81 ST. TAX NOTES 695
(Sept. 12, 2016) (arguing in favor of overturning Quill); Robert D. Plattner, Quill: Ten Years
After, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 1017 (Sept. 30, 2002) (criticizing Quill) with Arthur R. Rosen &
Matthew P. Hedstrom, Quill-Stare at the Decisision, 60 ST. TAX NOTES 931 (June 27, 2011)
(defending Quill); Edward A. Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice,
Exit, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA. TAX REV. 1, 4 (2008) (offering a political-
voice-based argument for the physical presence rule); Joseph Henchman, Why the Quill
Physical Presence Test Shouldn't Go the Way ofPersonal Jurisdiction, 46 ST. TAX NOTES 387
(Nov. 5, 2007) (defending Quill). See also Laura Davison, States, Retailers Continue to Spar
as Online Sales Grow, Bloomberg Daily Tax Report (BNA) (Apr. 13 2017).
See Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (urging a reconsideration of Quill given technological and economic changes
since 1992); Brief of Interested Law Professors as Amici Curiae supporting Petitioner, Brohl
v. Direct Mktg. Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015) (No. 16-458), 2015 LEXIS at *19 (urging the
Supreme Court to reconsider Quill).
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rule in the past,6 preferring instead to pass the buck to Congress,7 it appears
that the Kill Quill movement's day in court has finally arrived.8
Despite pressure from the states and industry groups, Congress
continually failed to address the physical presence rule since Quill was
decided,9 coming closest to replacing the rule with more intricate guidelines
in 2013, when the Marketplace Fairness Act passed the Senate before stalling
in the House.' 0 Given the inaction from Congress, the Kill Quill movement
viewed a return to the Supreme Court as the best means of overturning the
physical presence rule, ' and Kill Quill states passed legislation expressly
disregarding Quill spurring litigation over the physical presence rule.1 2 The
6 See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d 906 (Fla. 2016),
cert. denied, Dkt. No. 16-567 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2017); Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d
1129 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 591 (2016); Geoffrey Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n,
437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993); KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of
Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 97 (2011); Geoffrey, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Revenue, 899 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 2009), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 920 (2009);
Capital One Bank v. Commissioner of Revenue, 899 N.E.2d 76 (Mass. 2009), cert. denied,
557 U.S. 919 (2009); Bridges v. Geoffrey, Inc., 984 So. 2d 115 (La. App. I Cir. 2008), writ
denied, 978 So. 2d 370 (La. 2008); MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Ind. Dep't of State
Revenue, 895 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2008); Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 908 A.2d
176 (N.J. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1131 (2007).
7 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 ("[Retaining the physical presence rule] is made easier by
the fact that the underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be better qualified to
resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve.").
8 Ryan Prete, U.S. Supreme Court Will Hear Pivotal Digital Tax Case, Bloomberg
Daily Tax Report (BNA) (Jan. 12, 2018).
9 Edward A. Zelinsky, The Political Process Argument for the Supreme Court to
Overrule Quill, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1178-79 (2017) ("In the federal lawmaking process,
defenders of current law have the politically easier task of blocking change in a process which
affords them many opportunities to obstruct change. Quill gives that advantage to the internet
and mail order industries which need merely impede legislation to preserve the status quo -
as they have done successfully for over two decades."); Adam B. Thimmesch, The Fading
Bright Line ofPhysical Presence: DidKFC Corporation v. Iowa Department ofRevenue Give
States the Secret Recipe for Repudiating Quill?, 100 Ky. L.J. 339, 340 (2012) ("States have
responded to these losses by aggressively and continuously lobbying Congress to legislatively
overturn the physical-presence rule. Despite those efforts, however, Congress has not yet given
states the reprieve that they seek.").
10 160 Cong. Rec. S598 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2014) (memorializing H.R. Res. 571, 197th
Gen. Assemb., 2013 Sess. (Pa. 2013)). Harry J. Reske, U.S Senate Approves Marketplace
Fairness Act, 68 ST. TAX NOTES 499 (May 7, 2013) (noting the U.S. Senate's passage of the
S.743 by a 69-27 vote "[a]fter more than a decade of deliberation"). The Marketplace Fairness
Act of 2017 and other bills addressing the physical presence rule were introduced in April of
2017. Paige Jones, Remote Sales Tax Bills Reintroduced in Congress, 2017 ST. TAX TODAY
81-2 (Apr. 28, 2017).
1 See, e.g., Swain, supra note 4; Zelinsky, supra note 9; Brian Hamer, It's Time to
Challenge Quill, 6 ST. TAX NOTES 531 (May 19, 2015).
12 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. et al., 2017 S.D. 56 (2017); Newegg Inc. v. Dep't
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Supreme Court granted certiorari in one such case, South Dakota v. Wayfair,
Inc., in January of 2018.13
However, it is not clear that the Supreme Court will discard the physical
presence rule. Despite the Kill Quill movement's arguments otherwise,
technical and economic circumstances have not necessarily changed enough
since Quill to merit reconsidering the holding. Quill itself was decided largely
on grounds of stare decisis; changed circumstances arguments failed to
convince the Court to abandon the physical presence rule in 1992.14 More
may be needed to sway the Court this time. This article offers a novel
dissection of Quill, exposing an additional avenue for challenging the
physical presence rule - attacking certain aspects of the reasoning
underlying the rule.' 5 As Justice Kennedy recently noted, "Quill. . . should
be left in place only if a powerful showing can be made that its rationale is
still correct."1 6 This article adds to the argument that it never fully was
correct.
At best, Quill was not thorough in providing the analytical basis for the
physical presence rule; at worst, its reasoning is fatally flawed. The base
problem with Quill is two-fold: the Court struggled with what the U.S.
Constitution requires for jurisdiction to tax and with when and how the
jurisdiction to tax standards apply. More specifically, the Quill Court failed
to fully consider: (1) the basis for requiring a connection between the taxing
state and the taxpayer under the Commerce Clause, (2) all of the burdens a
state tax action might place on a taxpayer and the relationship of the
taxpayer's physical presence to those burdens, (3) the nature, regulatory or
tax, of use tax collection obligations, (4) the substance of those obligations if
they are characterized as taxes, and (5) the full scope of use taxes, particularly
in relation to sales taxes. Through examining the Court's stated objectives for
state and local taxation, this article offers principles to guide jurisdiction to
tax analysis. At a high level, these principles are that jurisdiction to tax
of Revenue, No. S. 16-613 (Ala. Tax Trib. Aug. 26, 2016).
13 Granting of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., No. 17-494
(U.S. Jan. 12, 2018); see also supra note 8.
14 Quill, 504 U.S. at 317 ("[T]he continuing value of a bright-line rule in this area and
the doctrine and principles of stare decisis indicate that the Bellas Hess rule remains good
law.").
15 To be clear, the changed circumstances arguments are not the only lines of attacks
advanced on the Quill decision, and commentators have challenged other aspects of the
reasoning in Quill. See, e.g., Richard D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and
Quill, 65 Am. U. L. REV. 1115, 1144-54 (2016). As Professor Pomp observes, at the time of
his 2016 article, "[m]any, many articles have discussed Quill. A computer search of only law
review articles, notes, and comments that have 'Quill' in their titles indicates there are more
than seventy." Id. at 1120. This article offers an addition to, not a dismissal of, the analyses of
those articles and the critiques of Quill they offer.
16 Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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standards should broadly consider the burdens state tax actions place on
interstate commerce and that the jurisdictional standards must consider the
type of tax imposed - one size does not necessarily fit all. A close
examination of Quill shows that the decision failed to adhere to these
principles.
This article proceeds in five Parts. The next Part, Part II, describes the
Kill Quill movement and the Quill decision in more depth and argues that
technological and economic circumstances have not changed in a
constitutionally relevant way since the time Quill was decided. Therefore, the
physical presence rule is not necessarily suspect on those grounds alone. Part
III tackles the first base problem in Quill: what the U.S. Constitution demands
for jurisdiction to tax. This Part confronts this problem by focusing on the
somewhat-novel legal question regarding what type of connection a taxing
state must have with a taxpayer before jurisdiction to tax exists. This question
is "somewhat-novel" because such a connection is clearly required under the
case law, but the basis and extent of that connection have not been fully
developed by the Court. Part III argues that this connection between state and
taxpayer should ensure that interstate commerce is not unduly burdened by
the state's actions and, to do so, must account for more than just the
compliance costs of the tax imposed on the taxpayer. The standard must also
ensure that the taxpayer has the ability to draw on funds from the taxed
activity to pay the tax. Thus, jurisdiction to tax is dependent on the taxpayer's
connection to the activity taxed. Under such an understanding, the physical
presence rule is immediately suspect - does the rule fairly indicate a
connection between the taxpayer and the activity taxed?
Part IV then takes up the second base problem in Quill - when and how
the jurisdiction to tax standards apply to a state action - by zeroing in on the
Court's unexplained application of those standards to use tax collection
obligations. This Part argues that the standards must consider the type of state
action in order to reach an appropriate result, even down to the level of the
character of the tax being imposed. This principle derives from the Court's
determination to have substance control the analysis of state actions. 17
Despite this determination, the Court has failed to adequately examine the
nature of use tax collection obligations over the course of its jurisprudence,
a serious flaw that led the Court to the physical presence rule. A use tax
collection obligation could be characterized as a regulatory burden or as a tax
in and of itself, and the appropriateness of the physical presence rule is
17 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (rejecting formalistic
labels as controlling the constitutionality of a state tax and instead looking to economic
realities of the tax); see also Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1795
(2015) ("We see no reason why the distinction between gross receipts and net income should
matter, particularly in light of the admonition that we must consider 'not the formal language
of the tax statute but rather its practical effect."') (quoting Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279).
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questionable under either characterization. Regulatory burdens are not
necessarily subject to the tax rules; their constitutionality is typically
determined by balancing the state's interests against the free flow of the
national economy.18 In the tax realm, assuming the taxpayer's connections
with the state must be related to the activity taxed before jurisdiction to tax
exists, the activity being taxed in the case of a use tax collection obligation
must be uncovered before determining whether the taxpayer is appropriately
connected with that activity. If, as seems likely, a use tax collection
obligation is characterized as the same thing as a use tax, then the vendor
must have an in-state connection with the use of the product. Physical
presence might be the correct rule if the sale of a product in the state is the
only taxable use of the product, but use taxes fall on a broader range of
activities than just sales, something the jurisprudence has failed to recognize.
Therefore, by following the principle of considering the type of state action
at issue when applying the jurisdiction to tax standards, the Court might
determine that use taxes and use tax collection obligations need not rely on
the physical presence rule in the same way as sales taxes do.
Part V suggests actions the Kill Quill movement might take to place the
issues raised by the analysis contained in the earlier Parts squarely in front of
the Court and offers an example of what a nexus standard that tracks closer
to the goals of the Commerce Clause might look like. The Kill Quill
movement can confront Quill head on by pushing the Court to recognize the
large scope of activities use taxes apply to, thereby removing use taxes from
the shadow of sales taxes. Alternatively, the movement could alter aspects of
use tax collection obligations to clearly differentiate them from those
considered in Quill, limiting the practical application of the decision. In
particular, Kill Quill states could act to characterize use tax collection
obligations as regulatory burdens instead of taxes or to characterize the
obligations as taxes other than use taxes. If the Court were convinced to
discard the physical presence rule, a more fundamentally sound nexus rule
might ask whether the state imposes compliance costs on the taxpayer out of
all appropriate proportion to the taxpayer's activities in the state relating to
1 See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the [state] statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that
will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.") (internal
citations omitted); see also Philip M. Tatarowicz, Right to a Refund for Unconstitutionally
Discriminatory State Taxes and Other Controversial State Tax Issues under the Commerce
Clause, 41 TAx LAW. 103, 106-10 (1987) (discussing the differing constitutional analyses of
regulatory burdens and tax burdens).
2018] 319
Virginia Tax Review
the activity taxed. Finally, Part VI concludes.
II. THE KILL QUILL MOVEMENT
Sales taxes and use taxes are closely related. Sales taxes have a rich
history in the United States; forty-five states and the District of Columbia
impose a sales tax.19 Generally speaking, sales taxes are consumption taxes
on the transfer of title to or possession of a product for consideration. 20 on
the other hand, use taxes - also imposed by those forty-five states and the
District of Columbia - are consumption taxes levied on the use of the
product sold and were adopted subsequent to or contemporaneously with
sales taxes, often with the stated goal of balancing the amount of tax owed
on products purchased in-state and those purchased out-of-state.21 Many
states refer to their use taxes as "complementary" to their sales taxes, 22 and
the states offer credits against their use taxes for other states' sales taxes
applied to the taxed product. 23 In practical understanding then, sales taxes
apply only to products purchased in-state, and use taxes apply to products
purchased out-of-state sales-tax-free and subsequently brought into the
taxing state for use there.24
Some states impose legal responsibility for sales taxes and use taxes on
the consumer, others on the vendor. 25 However, every state that imposes the
taxes either requires vendors to collect the taxes from their customers or
permits the vendors to do so, in effect passing the burden of the taxes along
1 RICHARD D. POMP, STATE & LOCAL TAXATION 6-1 to 6-3 (8th ed. 2015). The five
states without general sales taxes are referred to as the NOMAD states - New Hampshire,
Oregon, Montana, Alaska, and Delaware. Some of these states do impose specific sales taxes.
Id.
20 Id. at 6-7.
21 Id. at 6-39 to 6-43; see also Paul J. Hartman, Sales Taxation in Interstate Commerce,
9 VAND. L. REv. 138, 165 (1956); Robert C. Brown, The Future of Use Taxes, 8 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 495, 504 (1941).
22 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 7203 ("The use tax portion of any sales and use
tax ordinance adopted under this part shall impose a complementary tax. . . ."); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-164.6 (imposing a "complementary use tax"); W. VA. CODE § I 1-15A-la(1) ("It
is the intent of the Legislature that the use tax imposed by the provisions of article fifteen-a
and the consumers sales tax imposed by the provisions of article fifteen of this chapter be
complementary laws. . . .").
23 POMP, supra note 19, at 6-39.
24 This is an oversimplification; a use tax can also apply when a product is manufactured
or purchased in-state sales-tax-free and is then used in the state in a taxable manner. Id. at
6-39.
25 Compare, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 1133 (imposing liability for the tax on the consumer,
see also 20 NYCRR 525.2(a)(4) (explaining the nature of the sales tax as a "consumer tax"))
with, e.g., CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 6051 (imposing liability for the tax on the vendor).
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to consumers. 26 Where responsibility for the taxes is imposed on the
customer, if the vendor cannot be made to collect the taxes, the customer
remains liable to the state for the uncollected taxes. 27
In the 1992 Quill case, the Supreme Court, relying on its 1967 ruling in
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, confirmed
that a person must have a physical presence in a state before that state can
require the person to collect the state's use tax from its customers in the
state. 28 The Court described the physical presence rule as "a means for
limiting state burdens on interstate commerce," 29 and justified it as "firmly
establish[ing] the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to
collect sales and use taxes and reduc[ing] litigation concerning those
taxes." 30 The Court also justified the rule by noting that it "encourages settled
expectations and, in doing so, fosters investment by businesses and
individuals," 3 1 and that without the rule an interstate vendor might be unduly
burdened with use tax collection obligations in "the Nation's 6,000-plus
taxing jurisdictions." 32
Nevertheless, according to one study, the physical presence rule, coupled
with states' inability to collect use taxes from individual consumers,
contributed to an estimated $11.4 billion in lost revenues among all states in
2012. Additionally, state sovereignty may also be increasingly damaged by
26 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1656.1; CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 6203; FLA. STAT. § 212.07;
N.Y. TAX LAW § 1131(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.8; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.052,
151.103; UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-12-107(a). Given that sales and use taxes are imposed on a
transaction-by-transaction basis, the vendor-collection scheme is viewed as the most
administratively effective approach to collecting the taxes. See, e.g., John A. Swain, State
Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for the Twenty-First Century,
38 GA. L. REv. 343, 345 (2004) ("As between collecting tax from each individual consumer
or from the seller, it is more administratively practical to collect the tax from the seller.").
27 E.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 1133(b).
28 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1992).
29 Id. at 313, 314-15.
30 Id. at 315.
31 Id. at 316.
32 Id. at 313 n.6.
33 See Donald Bruce, William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, State and Local Sales Tax Revenue
Losses from E-Commerce, 52 ST. TAX NoTEs 537 (Apr. 13, 2009). The researchers expect that
such revenue loses "will likely continue to grow rapidly, at least for the next several years."
Donald Bruce, William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, E-tailer Sales Tax Nexus and State Tax
Policies, 68 NAT'L TAX J. 735, 736 (2015). Some commentators have questioned the accuracy
of this estimate. See Joseph Henchman, The Marketplace Fairness Act: A Primer, TAX
FOUNDATION (July 14, 2014), http://www.taxfoundation.org/article/marketplace-fairness-act-
primer; Billy Hamilton, Fox and Friends: The Rest of the Story on E-Commerce Tax Loss
Estimates, 68 ST. TAX NOTES 535 (May 13,2013); Noah Aldonas, DOR Disputes E-Commerce
Sales Tax Loss Estimates, 65 ST. TAX NOTES 576 (Aug. 27, 2012). Others have noted the
factors that cause estimates like those from the Bruce study to become outdated swiftly. See
2018] 321
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the physical presence rule as the amount of remote sales grows. 34 When
Maryland, say, decides to impose a certain amount of tax on consumption in
the state,3 5 Delaware inadvertently frustrates Maryland's legitimate policy by
offering a consumption-tax-free base for vendors. Because Maryland cannot
impose use tax collection obligations on "remote vendors" (vendors with no
physical presence in the state) from Delaware, Maryland's policies are
frustrated. These sovereignty harms offer strength to challenges to Quill but
present their own major weakness, namely that states such as Maryland
always have the authority to collect the taxes from their residents. Any
frustration to their tax policy from other states harboring remote vendors is
also the result of their choosing not to collect from their residents, 36
something which admittedly has proven very difficult on practical and
political grounds.3 7 Thus, the physical presence rule, and the Quill decision
by extension, is unpopular in many circles, and many states have long desired
jurisdiction to require remote vendors to collect use taxes. 3 8 The states' calls
for such authority have loudened with the continued growth of e-commerce
Pomp, supra note 15, at 1118 n. 8.
34 Many thanks to Paul Heald for drawing my attention to this concern.
35 The state policy here appears to be that of ensuring not that everyone who consumes
taxable things in the state pays tax to the state but that everyone who consumes taxable things
in the state pays an equal amount of tax overall. This is borne out by the fact that states with
sales taxes offer credits against those taxes for consumption taxes paid in other states. Thus,
the use tax becomes not a revenue-raiser, but an equalizer between differently-situated
consumers. The use tax is often referred to in these terms.
36 See Thimmesch, supra note 9, at 384 ("The inability of a state to collect its use tax
from a remote vendor does not have any impact on the imposition of that tax. The use tax is
fundamentally and directly a tax on the in-state consumer. That tax is due regardless of whether
the remote vendor collects the tax. Any competitive disadvantage, reduced tax revenue, or
inefficiencies are thus caused first and foremost by consumer noncompliance in reporting and
paying that tax.").
3 See Nina Manzi, Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns in Other States, H.R.
Res. Dep't 10 (Apr. 2015), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf (noting that
the percentage of taxpayers who report use tax in states where that tax can be reported on
income-tax returns is approximately 1.9%); Adam B. Thimmesch, Taxing Honesty, 118 W.
VA. L. REV. 147, 151-60 (2015) (noting difficulties creating the current "use tax gap"); Swain,
supra note 26, at 353 ("Sales made by remote sellers are subject to a de facto exemption ....
[T]he Supreme Court has required that a seller be physically present in a state before the state
can impose its use tax collection obligation, and it is administratively impractical for a state to
directly collect use taxes against individual consumers. Individual consumers seldom self-
assess use tax, and so the tax goes unpaid:"); Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income
and Consumption in the New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA.
L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2004) (discussing administrative problems states face in collecting use taxes
from individual consumers).
3 See Hayes R. Holderness, Taking Tax Due Process Seriously: The Give and Take of
State Taxation, 20 FLA. TAX REv. 371, 414-19 (2017) (surveying efforts to overturn the
physical presence rule).
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in the United States, spawning the current "Kill Quill" movement. 39
This movement has seen a number of somewhat peripheral legal
challenges to the Quill physical presence rule,40 but a few states have taken
bold action against Quill in recent years by enacting legislation and adopting
regulations which directly disregard the physical presence rule.41 Challenges
to these laws, particularly those of Alabama and South Dakota,42 have been
working their way through the courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the South Dakota case on January 12, 2018.43
Though the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, convincing it to
overturn the physical presence rule will be a difficult task. In deciding when
to follow its precedent, the Supreme Court has stated that "[o]ur precedent is
to be respected unless the most convincing of reasons demonstrates that
adherence to it puts us on a course that is sure error" and has identified
relevant factors in that determination as "workability, . . . the antiquity of the
precedent, the reliance interests at stake, . . . whether the decision was well
reasoned[, and] whether 'experience has pointed up the precedent's
shortcomings.'"4 4 The Kill Quill movement appears to be largely placing its
hopes on convincing the Supreme Court that technology and the economy
have changed enough in the twenty-five years or so since Quill was decided
to render the physical presence rule unworkable with clear shortcomings. 45
3 See Doug Sheppard, Tax Fight ofthe Year: States' War on Quill, 2017 ST. TAX TODAY
3-6 (Jan. 5, 2017); Hamilton, supra note 1; Julie Magee (@juliepmagee), Twitter,
https://twitter.com/juliepmagee (making constant use of "#killquill").
40 See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d 906 (Fla. 2016),
cert. denied, No. 16-567 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2017) (challenging Florida's effort to tax out-of-state
deliveries by a Florida-based online flower retailer); Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d
1129 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 591 (2016) (challenging a Colorado law
requiring information reporting about use tax liabilities from vendors failing to collect the
Colorado use tax).
41 See sources cited supra note 3.
42 See supra note 12.
43 See supra note 13.
4 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362-63 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
45 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-1 (providing legislative findings regarding the need
to enact a law disregarding the physical presence rule including "the general growth of online
retail" eroding the state's sales tax base and "the [falling] costs of [use tax] collection ...
[g]iven modern computing and software options," as well as noting that the "argument [for
requiring remote sellers to collect use taxes] has grown stronger, and the cause more urgent,
with time," given these findings); Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134-35
(2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (urging a reconsideration of Quill given technological and
economic changes since 1992); Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1151 (10th Cir.
2016) (Gorsuch, concurring) ("Quill might be said to have attached a sort of expiration date
for mail order and internet vendors' reliance interests on Bellas Hess's rule by perpetuating its
rule for the time being while also encouraging states over time to find ways of achieving
comparable results through different means"); Andrew J. Haile, Sales Tax Exceptionalism, 4
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This is an extraordinary gamble for the movement; Quill itself relied heavily
on stare decisis to retain the physical presence rule it found in Bellas Hess,46
despite strong arguments being presented that technological, economic, and
legal circumstances had changed enough to abandon the Bellas Hess
decision.47 Quill thus offers little comfort to those looking to double-down
on the changed circumstances argument.
In Quill, North Dakota imposed a use tax collection obligation on Quill
Corporation, which the North Dakota Supreme Court allowed after
concluding that "'wholesale changes' in both the economy and the law made
it inappropriate to follow Bellas Hess today." 48 As the Quill Court noted,
"[t]he principal economic change noted by the [North Dakota] court was the
remarkable growth of the mail-order business 'from a relatively
inconsequential market niche' in 1967 to a 'goliath' with annual sales that
reached 'the staggering figure of $183.3 billion in 1989."'49
There is little qualitatively of substance that has changed since Quill
regarding how remote vendors operate. Quill Corporation was a remote
vendor with respect to North Dakota: it had no property or employees in the
state.50 It sold office equipment and supplies and solicited business through
COLUM. J. TAX L. 136, 156 (2013).
46 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992).
47 North Dakota focused its arguments primarily on the evolution of the Supreme
Court's legal standards. See Brief for Respondent at 55-56, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504
U.S. 298 (1991) (No. 91-194), 1991 LEXIS 667 at *7. The Court recognized these changes
and found them powerful enough to disregard Bellas Hess on due process grounds but not on
Commerce Clause grounds. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308 ("[T]o the extent that our decisions
have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a State for the
imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings as superseded by
developments in the law of due process."); see also id. at 311 ("While contemporary
Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for
the first time today, Bellas Hess is not inconsistent with Complete Auto and our recent cases.").
48 Quill, 504 U.S. at 303. Many of the amicus briefs filed in Quill in support of North
Dakota also argued that technological and economic changes merited the abandonment of the
physical presence rule. See, e.g., Brief of the National Governor's Association, National
Conference of State Legislatures, Council of State Governments, National Association of
Counties, International City/County Management Association, National Institute of Municipal
Law Officers, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and National League of Cities as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1991) (No. 91-194), 1991
LEXIS 666 at *1; Brief of the Multistate Tax Commission as Amicus Curiae supporting
Respondent, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1991) (No. 91-194), 1991 LEXIS
665 at *1; Brief for the State of New Jersey as Amicus Curiae supporting Respondent, Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1991) (No. 91-194) 1991 LEXIS 541 at *1.
49 Quill, 504 U.S. at 304.
5o Id. at 302. No property of consequence that is. Quill Corporation did send floppy disks
containing licensed software into the state. The Supreme Court determined that these disks
were insignificant. Id. at 315, n. 8.
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"catalogs and flyers, advertisements in national periodicals, and telephone
calls." 5 ' In total, its North Dakota sales accounted for approximately $1
million of its annual $200 million in national sales. 52 All of its deliveries into
North Dakota were made by mail or common carrier from outside of the
state. 53 Today's remote vendors have similar types of connections with their
customers and with the states; 54 the primary differences are that websites
have taken the place of catalogues and more customers have moved online to
place their orders.55 The internet is simply a means of advertising for sellers
akin to a catalogue and of transmitting orders for customers akin to a phone
call or mail order slip. If the types of vendor activities in Quill - accepting
orders outside of the state and fulfilling them by common carrier or mail -
were not enough to break the physical presence rule in 1992,56 it would seem
they are not enough to break the physical presence rule today.
However, the shift to internet-based selling may indicate that physical
connections are less important for today's vendors, making physical presence
an awkward jurisdictional rule. Even so, Quill Corporation's only physical
presence in North Dakota - that created by its catalogues and diskettes -
was deemed inconsequential and held no sway over the Court. Thus, the Quill
Court seemed unconcerned about the importance of physical connections to
vendors' business model, and convincing the Court to start caring now may
be difficult.
Also, today's technology may have advanced to the point that the
administrative burdens that would be placed on remote sellers if they had to
collect use taxes in all of the nation's taxing jurisdictions - over 6,000 by
s" Id at 302.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See Michael Fatale, State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical "Physical Presence"
Constitutional Standard, 54 TAx LAW. 105, 106 (2000) ("Internet vendors substantially
resemble mail order vendors, except that their sales are effected through Internet sites and not
through the dissemination of catalogs.").
5 Sales from e-commerce were $298.6 billion in 2014, making up 6.4% of retail sales,
compared with $44 billion and 1.4% in 2002, the earliest year on which the U.S. Census
Bureau has data. Compare U.S. Census Bureau, E-Stats 2014: Measuring the Electronic
Economy (June 7, 2016), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library
/publications/2016/econ/el4-estats.pdf, with U.S. Census Bureau, E-commerce 2002
Highlights (Apr. 15, 2004), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census
/library/publications/2004/econ/2002finaltext.pdf.
56 In fact, the Quill Court appeared almost proud of the economic changes observed
between Bellas Hess and Quill, as though those changes were intended by the Bellas Hess
Court. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 316 ("Indeed, it is not unlikely that the mail-order industry's
dramatic growth over the last quarter century is due in part to the bright-line exemption from
state taxation created in Bellas Hess.").
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the Quill Court's count57 - are no longer a significant concern, removing a
justification for the physical presence rule. 58 This argument is not bullet-
proof. Even assuming that today's technology has advanced to a point where
compliance is easier, remote vendors might still have to pay for that
technology and would still be subject to the administrative burden of
potential audits from the various taxing jurisdictions. The audit concern is a
significant one, and was so even in the time of Quill.59 As North Dakota's
brief in Quill observed, many mail order businesses were already collecting
use taxes because they had related companies with physical presence in the
taxing states. 60 If those companies could figure out the intricacies of each
jurisdiction's tax laws, it is reasonable to expect that all remote vendors could
for some reasonable price. Thus, a major reason to stay out of a state would
be to avoid that state's authority to audit the remote vendor. Indeed, in 2016,
the Tenth Circuit decided in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl that
Colorado could require remote vendors that did not collect the state's use tax
to issue information reports to the state and to their customers in the state
" Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n. 6.
5 See generally Swain, supra note 4 (arguing that if lower administrative burdens were
placed on remote sellers, the physical presence rule could be disregarded); but see Thimmesch,
supra note 9, at 387 (offering a counter-argument to the reduced burdens rationale for
abandoning Quill).
59 See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n. 6 (noting the compliance burdens existing then and
in the time of Bellas Hess); Brief for Petitioner, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298
(1991) (No. 91-194), 1991 LEXIS 570 at *58-67 (detailing the burdens that would be placed
on remote vendors if the physical presence rule were not in place); Brief for the States of New
Hampshire, Delaware and Maine as Amici Curiae supporting Petitioner, Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1991) (No. 91-194), 1991 LEXIS 661 at *34 (noting concerns about
the burden of audit costs on vendors if the physical presence rule were not adopted); Brief
Amici Curiae of the National Association of Manufacturers; the National Association of
Broadcasters; the American Advertising Federation; the American Association of Advertising
Agencies, Inc.; the Industry Council on Tangible Assets; and Printing Industries of America
as Amici Curiae supporting Petitioner, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1991) (No.
91-194), 1991 LEXIS 564 at *30-31 (same); Brief of the Coalition for Small Direct Marketers
as Amici Curiae supporting Petitioner, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1991) (No.
91-194), 1991 LEXIS 563 at *15-32 (same); Brief of the Direct Marketing Association as
Amici Curiae supporting Petitioner, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1991) (No.
91-194), 1991 LEXIS 540 at *35 (same).
60 Brief for Respondent, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1991) (No. 91-194),
1991 LEXIS 667 at *55-56 (1991) ("There is no logical reason for differentiating between
multistate direct marketing businesses such as Sears or J.C. Penney and their direct marketing
competitors . . . . The decisions holding that nationwide retailers like Sears must collect sales
or use taxes on their catalog sales further demonstrate that an administrative burden associated
with use tax collection is irrelevant to the commerce clause inquiry. If the existence of such a
cost were sufficient to establish a commerce clause violation for direct marketers like Quill, it
should also be sufficient for Sears and J.C. Penney.").
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detailing their use tax liabilities. 61 In response to that decision, some remote
vendors have stated that they would comply with the reporting rather than
voluntarily collect the use taxes in part to avoid the state's audit authority. 62
Though Congress could (relatively) easily address the audit concerns in
legislation removing the physical presence rule, the Supreme Court is ill-
suited to craft such rules. 63
On the other hand, there is a quantitative difference between today's
world and that of Quill's in the volume of sales made by remote vendors,
particularly online vendors.6 The change in volume may be enough to sway
some Justices, such as Justice Kennedy,65 but it also may not carry the day.
If Quill Corporation lacked the appropriate substantive connections with
North Dakota, it is an uphill battle to argue that remote vendors today have
the appropriate connections simply because there are more remote vendors
and more remote sales. The quality of contacts should matter more as a
constitutional matter than the quantity of them. If an activity is substantively
not nexus-creating, a lot of that activity should still not be nexus-creating. 66
Additionally, though the physical presence rule is harming the states more
today than in 1992 by an absolute measure of use taxes uncollected, the state
losses from that rule account for only 3.8% of all sales and use tax collections
by one measure. 67 This figure would seem a precarious one to base a
challenge to Quill on. The effects on state sovereignty of changed
circumstances are difficult to measure, but recall that the frustrations to state
61 Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
591 (2016).
62 See Tripp Baltz, Overstock, Others Will Report, Not Collect Colorado Tax, DAILY
TAX REP. (BNA), Jan. 2017, at HI ("[W]e're not excited about exposing Overstock to another
state audit, and by voluntarily collecting, we'd be exposing ourselves to audits by the state of
Colorado.").
6 Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 (noting that Congress "may be better qualified to resolve" issues
regarding the allocations of burdens resulting from a change in the physical presence rule);
see also George S. Isaacson & Matthew P. Schaefer, Retail Giants vs. Small Business: The
Real Remote Sales Tax Fight, 83 ST. TAx NoTEs 741, 744 (Feb. 27, 2017) ("Congress alone
has the expertise and legislative tools to view the issue on a national scale, taking account of
the competing interests while ensuring that America's small businesses can continue to thrive
and grow."); Thimmesch, supra note 9, at 387.
6 See sources cited supra note 55.
65 See Direct Mktg. Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. at 1134-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66 However, activities that are not nexus-creating because they are de minimis should be
expected to create nexus when their quantity increases. For example, if Quill Corporation had
inundated North Dakota with floppy disks, perhaps the state would have had nexus over the
company.
67 See Bruce et al., supra note 33. The Bruce et al. study determined that unpaid sales
and use taxes on online sales contributed to an estimated $11.4 billion in lost tax revenues
among all states in 2012. The uncollected amount represented 3.8% of total sales tax liabilities
for 2012.
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policy fall partially on the states themselves, making such harms less
compelling. 68
In sum, changed circumstances arguments were a primary basis of the
challenge to the physical presence rule in Quill but were unsuccessful. While
technological and economic circumstances have changed since Quill was
decided, there are reasons to doubt that the changed circumstances arguments
would succeed where they failed in 1992.69 Fortunately for the Kill Quill
movement, there are other lines of attack on the physical presence rule that
can supplement those arguments. 7 0 Through engaging in a novel dissection
of the Quill decision, this article outlines one such alternative line of attack
that was not advanced in Quill: challenging the reasoning behind the physical
presence rule,71 particularly the basis for requiring that a state have a
"substantial nexus" with the taxpayer under the Commerce Clause and the
failure of Quill and its forbearers to examine the nature and substance of use
tax collection obligations. Exploring the weaknesses in the reasoning behind
the rule exposes the Court's struggles with defining the standards for
jurisdiction to tax and determining when and how those standards apply. The
following Parts address those struggles and, in so doing, demonstrate the
fragility of the physical presence rule's foundations.
III. THfE BURDEN OF JURISDICTION TO TAX: REDUCING UNDUE BURDENS
In Quill, the Supreme Court articulated two separate sets of limitations
on state tax jurisdiction: those arising from the Due Process Clause and those
arising from the Commerce Clause. 72 Generally speaking, "[t]he Due Process
Clause demands that there exist "some definite link, some minimum
connection, between a state and the person ... it seeks to tax," as well as a
rational relationship between the tax and the 'values connected with the
taxing State."' 73 On the other hand, the Commerce Clause requires the
existence of a "substantial nexus" between the activity taxed and the taxing
68 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
69 See Thimmesch, supra note 9, at 387-88.
70 See, e.g., Pomp, supra note 15, at 1144-54.
71 See Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("Quill. . . should be left in place only if a powerful showing can be made that its
rationale is still correct."); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362-63 (2010) ("Beyond
workability, the relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis
include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and ofcourse whether the
decision was well reasoned.") (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
72 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) ("Thus, although we have not
always been precise in distinguishing between the two, the Due Process Clause and the
Commerce Clause are analytically distinct.").
7 MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 24 (2008), quoting Quill,
504 U.S. at 306.
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state. 74 The Quill Court provided that there must also be a substantial nexus
under the Commerce Clause between the taxpayer and the state. 75 Thus, the
Supreme Court has made explicit that the U.S. Constitution requires
connections between a taxing state and the taxpayer as well as the taxing state
and the activity taxed before jurisdiction to tax exists.
What remains unclear is why there must be a substantial nexus between
the state and the taxpayer under the Commerce Clause (rather than just the
due process minimum connections) and whether there must also be a
connection between the taxpayer and the activity taxed. These uncertainties
belie the weakness of the reasoning in Quill and Bellas Hess. The following
parts explain the Court's stated requirements for tax jurisdiction and explore
the source and justification - reducing burdens on interstate commerce -
for the required substantial nexus between the taxing state and the taxpayer.
In order to achieve the goals of this substantial nexus requirement, a broader
and more exacting consideration of the burdens state tax actions can place on
interstate commerce than that which the Court has offered so far is needed.
Under such an approach, the physical presence rule is immediately suspect.
A. State Connections with the Taxpayer and with the Activity Taxed
As noted, the Supreme Court has articulated three connections that must
exist for a state to have jurisdiction to tax: (1) a due process nexus between
the state and the taxpayer, (2) a Commerce Clause nexus between the state
and the activity taxed, and (3) a Commerce Clause nexus between the state
and the taxpayer. The Due Process Clause is "concerned with the
fundamental fairness of governmental activity," and in the context of state
tax jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has "often identified 'notice' or 'fair
warning' as the analytic touchstone of due process . . . analysis." 76 I have
argued elsewhere that the due process nexus standard for state tax jurisdiction
is transactional in nature: the requirement that there be a rational relationship
between the tax and the values connected with the taxing state demands that
the taxing state provide the taxpayer with some benefit, and the requirement
that there be a minimum connection between the state and the taxpayer
requires that that the taxpayer indicate acceptance of the state-provided
benefit through purposefully directing activities towards the state's economic
market. 77 Given the broad scope of benefits a state could provide a person,
the primary jurisdictional limitation under the Due Process Clause is whether
74 Quill, 504 U.S. at 311.
75 Id. ("Bellas Hess ... stands for the proposition that a vendor whose only contacts with
the taxing State are by mail or common carrier lacks the 'substantial nexus' required by the
Commerce Clause.").
76 Id. at 312.
n7 See generally Holdemess, supra note 38.
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the taxpayer has created a minimum connection with the taxing state by
sufficiently directing activities towards the state.
The Commerce Clause establishes the connection required between the
taxing state and the activity taxed, as well as an additional connection
required between the taxing state and the taxpayer. In contrast to the Due
Process Clause, the Commerce Clause addresses "structural concerns about
the effects of state regulation on the national economy."78 To achieve this
goal, the Commerce Clause prohibits state tax actions that "unduly burden
interstate commerce." 79 Generally, a state action is deemed to unduly burden
interstate commerce when the burdens placed on interstate commerce
outweigh the state's interests in taking the action; a balancing test is used.80
Taxation certainly is a compelling state action, and the Court has developed
a four-part test to guide the analysis of the burden on interstate commerce
that a state tax might impose:
[W]e will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so
long as the "tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to
the services provided by the State." 81
The test derives from the 1977 case of Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady,82 and is thus commonly referred to as the "Complete Auto test." 83 The
first prong of the test establishes the primary Commerce Clause limitation on
a state's jurisdiction to tax. The remaining factors are concerned with the
structure of the tax. The precise meaning of "substantial nexus" has not been
fully resolved by the Supreme Court, but the Court has provided that the
" Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
79 Id.
80 See supra note 18. The Supreme Court has adopted "a two-tiered approach to
analyzing state economic regulation under the Commerce Clause." Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986). When a regulatory measure
"has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly," the Court
applies a balancing analysis, looking to "whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether
the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits." Id. at 579 (citing Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). However, "[w]hen a state statute directly
regulates . . . interstate commerce," the Court has "generally struck down the statute without
further inquiry." Id. at 579.
" Quill, 504 U.S. at 311. Many argue that this test incorporates not only Commerce
Clause ideals but Due Process Clause ideals as well. See, e.g., Michael T. Fatale, The Evolution
ofDue Process and State Tax Jurisdiction, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 565, 578 (2015).
82 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
83 See John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy
Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 319, 328 (2003).
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standard requires more than "the slightest presence" in the taxing state 84 and
that physical presence meets the standard in the context of sales and use
taxes.8 5 Interestingly, the Quill Court did not analyze the connection between
the taxing state and the activity it determined had been taxed - the use of
property - perhaps because the activity clearly took place in the state,
making the inquiry (or any challenge to the connection) moot. Instead, the
Quill Court held that the taxpayer must have a physical presence in the taxing
state to satisfy the Commerce Clause in the context of use tax collection
obligations.87 It is this physical presence rule that the Kill Quill movement is
challenging.
The Court failed to explain the basis for the required substantial nexus
between the taxpayer and the taxing state. That requirement is not mentioned
in the Compete Auto test,88 though the Quill Court relied on the first prong
of the test when discussing the requirement. With the goals of the Commerce
Clause in mind, it is possible to form the justification for the required nexus
between the taxpayer and the taxing state, and doing so exposes weaknesses
in the reasoning behind the physical presence rule.
B. Justifying Substantial Nexus between the Taxing State and the Taxpayer
The Quill Court endorsed the physical presence rule - and thereby the
substantial nexus requirement between the taxpayer and the state -
intending to "further the ends of the dormant Commerce Clause."89 Thus, the
basis of the substantial nexus requirement is to prevent undue burdens on
taxpayers engaged in interstate commerce. The primary burdens placed on a
taxpayer by a taxing state are complying with the tax law and accessing the
tax base. Compliance concerns paying or remitting the correct amount of
money and the administrative costs associated with audits. Accessing the tax
base refers to the taxpayer's ability to access funds derived from the activity
taxed. For example, a taxpayer tasked with paying a real estate transfer tax
would have access to the tax base if she could access the money earned from
the transfer of the real estate. Thus, accessing the tax base concerns where
the tax money comes from; if the taxpayer cannot access the tax base, then
the money used to comply must come from another source, which may
84 National Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Equalization Bd., 430 U.S. 551, 556 (1977).
8 Quill, 504 U.S. at 314.
86 Id. at 301 ("This case ... involves a State's attempt to require an out-of-state mail-
order house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State to collect and pay a
use tax on goods purchased for use within the State.").
" Id. at 317-18.
88 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
89 Quill, 504 U.S. at 314.
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impose an undue burden on the taxpayer.90 Accessing the tax base may seem
a part of the compliance burden; the two are separated here on the grounds
that accessing the tax base does not require any direct interaction with the
state, whereas compliance with the law does.
Quill and Bellas Hess only considered the burden that compliance costs
place on interstate commerce, 91 and in both cases the Court failed to explain
how a taxpayer's physical presence is related to those costs (other than to say
that using physical presence as a rule would limit exposure to the costs, as
most any rule would).9 2 The Court must expand its analysis of the burdens
placed on interstate commerce by state tax actions if the required substantial
nexus between the state and the taxpayer is to serve its purpose. The
following subparts offer such an expanded analysis by considering how that
substantial nexus might address compliance costs and costs of accessing the
tax base.
1. Mitigating Compliance Costs
Requiring a substantial nexus between the taxing state and the taxpayer
does mitigate the aggregate burden compliance costs impose on interstate
commerce by ensuring that certain people engaged in interstate commerce
are not subject to those costs in every state. The Quill Court and the Bellas
Hess Court attempted to justify the physical presence rule on these grounds, 93
but it is a blunt rule. The Supreme Court has never explained how a
taxpayer's physical presence is related to the burden of compliance costs
90 Because money is fungible, direct access to the tax base may not be necessary as a
constitutional matter; a taxpayer could take funds from one source and replace them later with
funds from the activity taxed.
91 See David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation
of E-Commerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483, 501 (2012) ("As in Quill, the only discussion in the
Bellas Hess decision about how allowing states to impose use tax compliance obligations on
remote vendors might burden interstate commerce relies on the overlapping compliance duties
that could be imposed by multiple jurisdictions.").
92 See Swain, supra note 26, at 362 ("What is not apparent from the Court's discussion
is how a physical presence test reduces the burden.").
93 Id. at 313 n. 6.
[I]f Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every other State, and so, indeed, can
every municipality, every school district, and every other political subdivision
throughout the Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes. The many
variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and
record-keeping requirements could entangle National's interstate business in a
virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate
claim to impose 'a fair share of the cost of the local government.'
Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1967).
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imposed on that taxpayer, 94 perhaps because there is little relation between
the two.95 In short, the Court has never fully justified the use of the physical
presence rule to mitigate the burden of compliance costs on interstate
commerce, it has only justified having a rule.
If the goal is to mitigate undue burdens (not just burdens generally), the
more appropriate inquiry concerns the size of the vendor: 96 compliance costs
burden large vendors to a proportionately lower degree than small vendors.97
Physical presence is a poor tool for determining the size of a remote vendor:
though a small remote vendor is unlikely to have a physical presence in a
large number of states, a large remote vendor can avoid having a physical
presence in many states. 98 For example, for many years Amazon.com, a giant
of online retailing, strategically avoided having a physical presence in most
states, even going so far as to issue maps to its employees showing states they
could and could not enter.99 Though it made sales nationwide, Amazon was
protected in most states from tax collection obligations due to the physical
94 See supra notes 29-322 and accompanying text; Pomp, supra note 15, at 1145-46
("One fundamental problem with Quill is that the Court never explained what physical
presence in a state has to do with limiting state burdens on interstate commerce, retreating into
bromides about the value of bright lines and how they can be rough around the edges ....
[Nlowhere does the Court explain why the burden of collecting the use tax is reduced when a
mail-order vendor has property in the state, or has engaged the services of ten part-time,
independent contractors within the state.").
95 See supra note 60 and accompanying text; Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 766 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting) ("There is no doubt that the collection of taxes from consumers is a burden; but it
is no more of a burden on a mail order house such as appellant located in another State than
on an enterprise in the same State which accepts orders by mail; and it is, indeed, hardly more
of a burden than it is on any ordinary retail store in the taxing State."); Pomp, supra note 15,
at 1138; Swain, supra note 4.
96 See Swain, supra note 26, at 361-64 (discussing the problems with the physical
presence rule as a measure of burdens on the use tax collector).
97 Donald Bruce & William F. Fox, An Analysis ofInternet Sales Taxation and the Small
Seller Exemption, SMALL Bus. ADMIN., 35-36 (2013); see also Isaacson & Schaefer, supra
note 63 (detailing the relatively higher burdens that state tax compliance places on smaller
vendors); Natasha Varyani, Taxing Electronic Commerce: The Efforts of Sales and Use Tax
to Evolve with Technology, 39 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 151, 172 (2014).
98 Bruce & Fox, supra note 97, at 32-34 (determining that approximately 53% of sales
and use taxes go uncollected because large remote vendors lack physical presence in many
states into which they sell); Swain, supra note 4; Varyani, supra note 97, at 173-74, 188.
99 Steve Wasserman, The Amazon Effect, THE NATION, June 18, 2012),
https://www.thenation.com/article/steve-wasserman-amazoncoms-takeover/. (detailing the
growth of Amazon.com and observing that the company relied on the physical presence rule
"to avoid collecting hundreds of millions of dollars in state sales taxes, giving Amazon an
enormous edge over retailers of every kind, from bookstores to Best Buy and Home Depot.");
Stu Woo, Amazon Battles States Over Sales Tax, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 3, 2011
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl000142405311190477230457 6468753564916130.
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presence rule.' 00 Currently, Wayfair, another large internet-based retailer,
collects sales taxes in twelve states.10 1 Assuming Wayfair has a physical
presence in all of those states, is it really reasonable to conclude that the
retailer Homage, which has seven brick-and-mortar stores total in three
states, 102 is a quarter of Wayfair's size on those facts alone? If the physical
presence rule is intended to protect vendors from undue compliance costs, it
provides imperfect protections for small vendors (who might have physical
presence in multiple states) and permits at least partially elective avoidance
for large vendors (who need not have a physical presence in all the states into
which they sell).1 03
However, though not addressed by the Supreme Court, the physical
presence rule may do a better job of addressing the taxpayer's burden of
accessing the tax base by ensuring that the taxpayer has a connection to the
activity taxed. To evaluate the rule on these grounds, the Court must establish
what type of connection between the taxpayer and the activity taxed the
Commerce Clause demands.
2. Ensuring Access to the Tax Base
If the taxpayer is to have access to the tax base, presumably some
connection must exist between the taxpayer and the activity taxed.1 04
However, neither the due process standards provided by the Supreme Court
nor the Complete Auto test make any mention of a required connection
between a taxpayer and the activity taxed. In fact, the Court has intimated
that such a connection may be unnecessary as a matter of constitutional law.
In National Geographic Society v. California Equalization Board, California
imposed a use tax collection obligation on the National Geographic Society,
100 As of April 2017, Amazon.com is collecting taxes in all states imposing them. See
Paul Jones, Amazon Finalizes Deals to Collect Taxes in All Remaining States, 2017 ST. TAX
TODAY 55-1 (Mar. 23, 2017).
101 See Ordering Information, WAYFA[R.COM, http://www.wayfair.com/
customerservice/orderinginfo.php (last visited June 30, 2017) ("One of the best things about
buying through Wayfair is that we do not have to charge sales tax, with a few notable
exceptions: orders shipping to Alabama, California, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, [and]
Utah . . . .").
102 See Retail, HOMAGE, https://www.homage.com/pages/retail (last visited June 30,
2017).
103 See Swain, supra note 83, at 342.
104 For purposes of this analysis, it will be assumed that the quality of the connection
between the taxpayer and activity taxed is only that which would grant the taxpayer
straightforward access to the tax base, such that only de minimis costs are incurred to reach
the funds related to the activity taxed. The question of the quality of connection is open, and
may require more.
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which owned and operated two stores in California.1 05 Invoking both the Due
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause, the Society argued that it should
not have to collect use taxes on mail order sales it made to California
customers because the Society's activities in California were unrelated to
those mail order sales. 106 The Court summarized the argument as follows:
"The Society argues in other words that there must exist a nexus or
relationship not only between the seller and the taxing State, but also between
the activity of the seller sought to be taxed and the seller's activity within the
State." 107
The Court rejected this argument, establishing that no in-state
connection between the taxpayer and the activity taxed must exist, but in so
doing, relied solely on due process standards:
[T]he relevant constitutional test to establish the requisite nexus for
requiring an out-of-state seller to collect and pay the use tax is not
whether the duty to collect the use tax relates to the seller's activities
carried on within the State, but simply whether the facts demonstrate
"some definite link, some minimum connection, between [the State
and] the person . .. it seeks to tax."108
The Court did not make a separate inquiry under the Commerce Clause
or note what that clause demanded. Indeed, the Due Process Clause and
Commerce Clause analyses were lumped together by the Court until Quill,
creating a "quagmire" of decisions. 109 The split of the analyses in Quill was
based on the acceptance that the two clauses had different goals and thus
demanded different analyses.' 10 Therefore, it is unsurprising that prior to
Quill, the Court failed to consider the separate goals of the Commerce Clause
when addressing the argument for a constitutionally required in-state
connection between taxpayer and activity, but this failure left an analytical
void in the jurisprudence.
105 National Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Equalization Bd., 430 U.S. 551, 552-53 (1977).
106 Id. at 560.
107 id.
'0 Id. at 561.
109 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315-16 (1992); see also Pomp, supra
note 15, at 1149 ("Prior to Quill, the Court never had any reason to specify whether a nexus
decision was grounded on one clause or the other.").
110 Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.
11 Professor Pomp wisely cautions against reading pre-Quill nexus cases as being
decided solely under the Due Process Clause or solely under the Commerce Clause. Pomp,
supra note 15, at 1149-50. This article does not take the position that National Geographic
Society is only a due process decision, rather it observes that the decision only referred to due
process concepts in reaching its conclusions. As discussed below, National Geographic
Society may be good law for Commerce Clause purposes, see infra notes 116-118 and
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There are three ways to conceptualize the connection the Commerce
Clause could require between the taxpayer and the activity taxed: (1) no
connection is necessary, (2) a connection is necessary, but the connection
need not be based on anything occurring in the taxing state (a "soft
connection"), or (3) a connection is necessary, and the connection must be
based on something occurring in the taxing state (a "hard connection").
Putting this statement in other terms, if no connection or a soft connection is
all that is necessary, the state's substantial nexus with the taxpayer does not
necessarily depend on the taxpayer's connection with the activity taxed; if a
hard connection is required, then the state's substantial nexus with the
taxpayer does depend on the taxpayer's connection with the activity taxed -
that connection forms the basis for the state's substantial nexus with the
taxpayer and must be in-state.
If the Commerce Clause requires no connection between the taxpayer
and the activity taxed, then there is no guarantee that the taxpayer will have
access to the tax base. In this scenario, a state tax could impose a high burden
on a taxpayer that meets whatever substantial nexus standard is in place11 2
- physical presence, say - because the taxpayer could be divorced from
the activity taxed. At the extreme, a state could require any person with a
substantial nexus with the state to collect from others any tax that is levied
on an activity within the state's jurisdiction. For example, Virginia might
require me - a physically present resident - to collect my Tennessee
colleague's Virginia income tax on income earned in the state. This result
would almost certainly be unduly burdensome on interstate commerce. The
costs of finding unrelated (and often out-of-state) people and property to
collect taxes from would surely discourage people from other states from
establishing nexus with the taxing state. If the tax base could not be accessed,
the taxpayer would have to pay out-of-pocket in order to comply with the
accompanying text, but if it is, it is exceedingly difficult to find a sound basis for the physical
presence rule. See infra Part III.C.
112 This connection would presumably be of a higher degree than the Due Process
Clause's required minimum connections. But see Rick Handel, A Conceptual Analysis of
Nexus in State and Local Taxation, 67 TAx LAW. 623, 630 (2014) ("If the Due Process Clause
requires certain minimum contacts with a state, the Commerce Clause does not require a
greater number of contacts."); Adam B. Thimmesch, The illusory Promise ofEconomic Nexus,
13 FLA. TAx REV. 157, 188-91 (2012) (discussing the "gratuitous elevation of the Commerce
Clause over the Due Process Clause"); Swain, supra note 83, at 372 ("The central conclusion
of this Article is that physical presence is not an income tax nexus requirement. Accordingly,
substantial nexus for income taxes may approach the due process minimum contacts
standard."); Jesse H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the Dormant Commerce Clause:
The Object-Measure Approach, 1998 SUP. CT. REv. 193, 213 (1998) ("We do not interpret the
Commerce Clause to require a separate nexus more stringent than that imposed by the Due
Process Clause because that is not required to further protect interstate commerce against state
taxes that accord a preference to local enterprises.").
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law. Though the states' interest in collecting taxes is a legitimate and
important one, it is difficult to imagine that interest outweighing the burden
on interstate commerce where no connection between taxpayer and activity
taxed is required. There would be less burdensome ways of collecting the
taxes, such as requiring taxpayers with connections to the activities taxed to
collect and pay the taxes. 113
It should be noted that National Geographic Society did not establish
that the Due Process Clause requires no connection between a taxpayer and
the activity taxed; the case determined only that due process does not require
an in-state connection. 114 Therefore, it is possible that the Due Process
Clause would prohibit the extreme state action proposed in the example in
the previous paragraph. Even so, the focus here is on the connection the
Commerce Clause requires between a taxpayer and the activity taxed. If the
Commerce Clause requires no such connection, then fewer grounds for the
physical presence rule exist (i.e., mitigating compliance costs - a suspect
justification 115 - would be its primary justification).
Requiring a soft connection between the taxpayer and the activity taxed
- essentially following National Geographic Society for Commerce Clause
purposes 11 6 - would alleviate the burden on interstate commerce of a no
connection regime by ensuring that the taxpayer has access to the tax base,
but would still impose a burden on interstate commerce by opening a person
up to state taxation based on out-of-state activities. That is to say, a state's
jurisdiction to tax could depend not on the in-state activities of the taxpayer
but on its out-of-state activities that connect it to the activity taxed. The
taxpayer might have some activity inside the state, but as with the taxpayer
in National Geographic Society, that activity would not be what the state is
subjecting to tax. Instead, the Commerce Clause would permit a state to
require a taxpayer to rely on its out-of-state activities to collect tax on the in-
state activity.1 17 Though subtle, this point should not be overlooked given the
Supreme Court's historic concerns about extraterritorial taxation.1 18
On the other hand, requiring a hard connection would ensure that the
113 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("[T]he extent of the burden
[on interstate commerce] that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.").
'14 National Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Equalization Bd., 430 U.S. 551, 560 (1977).
115 See supra Part III.B.1.
116 Assuming that National Geographic Society does not stand for the proposition that no
connection is required between the taxpayer and the activity taxed. See supra note 114 and
accompanying text.
117 Many thanks to Adam Thimmesch for helping me work through these ideas.
1 See Holderness supra note 38, at 402-04 (surveying the Supreme Court's concerns
about extraterritorial state taxation).
2018] 337
Virginia Tax Review
state's jurisdiction to tax depends solely on in-state activities. At base, a hard
connection regime should be comparable to a soft connection regime with
respect to addressing the costs of accessing the tax base - both ensure that
the taxpayer has such access. 1 9 However, a hard connection regime would
ease extraterritorial taxation concerns by ensuring that a state could only
require a taxpayer to rely on in-state activities to collect the tax imposed. For
example, suppose NationalGeographicSociety.com sold online maps to
California customers. If NationalGeographicSociety.com hosted those maps
on servers in California, then a hard connection might exist. If instead
NationalGeographicSociety.com conducted all of its activities relating to the
maps - designing, hosting, selling, etc. - in Washington, D.C., there would
be no hard connection establishing jurisdiction to tax, even if
NationalGeographicSociety.com hosted other data on servers in California.
Thus, a hard connection regime would be less permissive to the states than a
soft connection regime and would offer the highest protection for taxpayers
against the burdens of state tax actions.
The practical difference between a soft connection regime and a hard
connection regime is well-illustrated by the current debate over use tax
collection with respect to property purchased outside of the taxing state but
used in the state. If a soft connection is all that is required, then the collector's
physical presence in the taxing state should be irrelevant (assuming the
collector purposefully directs her activities towards the state): the state has a
substantial nexus with the use of property in the state; the collector has due
process minimum connections to the state; and the collector has a connection
to the use of the property resulting from the sale and transfer of the property
outside of the state. However, if a hard connection is required, then the
collector must have some activity in the state related to the use of the property
in the state, in-state delivery or advertising perhaps. Here, the physical
presence of the taxpayer in the taxing state may be relevant, but not
necessarily.
C. The Problem with Physical Presence
The Quill Court adopted the physical presence rule as a bright-line test
that avoids "case-by-case evaluation[s] of the actual burdens imposed by
particular regulations or taxes [in favor of] the demarcation of a discrete
realm of commercial activity that is free from interstate taxation."1 20
According to the Court, this bright-line test provides the benefit of clarity as
to when the appropriate nexus exists between the taxing state and the
119 Again, this analysis assumes that the connection needed between the taxpayer and the
activity taxed need rise only to the level of allowing the taxpayer straightforward access to the
tax base. See supra note 104.
120 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
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taxpayer. 12 1 But as the above discussion indicates, the rule, clear as it may
appear, suffers from a lack of strong reasoning and as a result may fail to
address the burdens a taxing state imposes on a taxpayer engaged in interstate
commerce - the physical presence of a taxpayer in the taxing state bears
little relation to the burden of compliance costs on the taxpayer and is
unnecessary in a no connection or soft connection regime.
Therefore, to begin to justify the Quill Court's adoption of the physical
presence rule for use tax collection obligations, a hard connection regime
must be assumed; the state's substantial nexus with the taxpayer is dependent
on the taxpayer having an in-state connection with the activity taxed. Under
this regime, physical presence may offer a reasonable approximation of when
a hard connection exists. A physically present vendor seems likely to
facilitate remote sales in some manner - through delivery, advertising, or
accepting returns122 - and thus case-by-case findings of the hard
connections between the taxpayers and the activities taxed could give way in
favor of the clarity of the rule. But even so, physical presence is not necessary
to create a hard connection in the context of use tax collection, as developed
in the following Part. As Justice White observed in his Quill dissent, "In
today's economy physical presence frequently has very little to do with a
transaction a State might seek to tax."1 2 3
IV. BESPOKE JURISDICTION TO TAX: ONE SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS RULE
DOES NOT FIT ALL
Assuming substantial nexus between'the taxing state and the taxpayer
demands a hard connection between the taxpayer and the activity taxed,1 24
what constitutes such substantial nexus can be expected to differ depending
on what is taxed. The Supreme Court demands that the substance of a tax
control the analysis of its constitutionality,1 25 and has indicated that the
factors of the Complete Auto test do not necessarily apply uniformly to all
121 Id.
122 In National Geographic Society, the Court noted many of these types of activities that
a physically present vendor might conduct. See National Geographic Soc'y, 430 U.S. 551,
560-61 (1977).
123 Quill, 504 U.S. at 328 (White, J., dissenting).
124 This assumption is made because a hard connection regime is the only regime under
which a physical presence rule is justified, see supra Part III.C., and therefore appears to be
the approach the Supreme Court favors.
125 Perhaps surprisingly, this was not always the case, but an exploration of the
"quagmire" of state and local tax jurisprudence leading to the current standard is beyond the
scope of this article. See PomP, supra note 19, at 1-1 to 1-21 (discussing the evolution of
jurisdictional requirements for state taxes under the Commerce Clause and noting the swings
between the formalistic and substantive analyses required).
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taxes. 126 It follows that the substance of the tax should determine the type of
activities that will establish a substantial nexus between the state and the
taxpayer; substantial nexus might be established differently for each
alternative type of tax. For example, substantial nexus in the case of an
income tax might depend on the ownership of income-generating assets,
tangible or intangible, in a state; substantial nexus in the case of a sales tax
might depend on being a party to the sales transaction in the state. This Part
applies this principle of "bespoke jurisdiction to tax" to use tax collection
obligations, further demonstrating the analytical shortcomings of the Quill
decision.
A major omission of the Supreme Court in Quill was its failure to
analyze the nature of a use tax collection obligation. What is such a thing? Is
it a regulatory burden placed on vendors to act for the benefit of the state? Or
is it the same as a payment obligation (i.e., equivalent to a tax itself)? If it is
a tax, what is the substance of that tax? The answers to these questions are
not necessarily clear, but the basis for physical presence as a jurisdictional
rule is questionable regardless of the answers. The following parts analyze
the appropriate jurisdictional standards for use tax collection obligations as
regulatory burdens and as taxes; though, as developed below, it should be
expected that the Court will view use tax collection obligations as taxes,
necessitating an understanding of what the activity taxed is in order to
develop appropriate substantial nexus rules.
A. Use Tax Collection Obligations as Regulatory Burdens
A tax collection obligation can be fairly characterized as a regulatory
burden imposed on people doing business in the state - particularly the
business of selling things subject to the tax - separate from the tax to be
collected. Indeed, in National Geographic Society, the Supreme Court
determined that a vendor's presence in the taxing state could be wholly
unrelated to selling the products on which use tax was to be collected and the
state would still have jurisdiction to impose the use tax collection obligation
on the vendor. 127 That Court even stated that "the sole burden imposed upon
the out-of-state seller by [use tax collection statutes] is the administrative one
126 See Walter Hellerstein, Michael J. McIntyre, & Richard D. Pomp, Commerce Clause
Restraints on State Taxation After Jefferson Lines, 51 TAx L. REV. 47, 107-08 (1995).
Professors Hellerstein, McIntyre, and Pomp argue that a pure reading of the Supreme Court's
1995 decision in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines indicates the form, rather than
the substance, of the tax may control the application of the Complete Auto test. For its own
part, the Jefferson Lines Court determined that the taxes it was considering were different in
substance. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 190-91 (1995).
127 National Geographic Soc'y, 430 U.S. at 551.
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of collecting [the use tax]." 2 8 This opinion did not clearly ground its holding
in the Commerce Clause, 129 and jurisdiction to tax standards have evolved
since the case, 130 but the holding does indicate that a use tax collection
obligation is different from the tax itself.1 31
If a use tax collection obligation is a regulatory burden and not a tax, a
state's authority to impose regulations on a business should be sufficient to
impose such an obligation, and it is not clear that the substantial nexus
requirement for state tax actions (and thus the physical presence rule) would
have any role to play in the analysis. The Commerce Clause would limit the
state's authority if the state's interest in the use tax collection obligation did
not outweigh the resulting burden on interstate commerce from the
obligation. 132 As tax collection is a compelling state interest, this balancing
test may be more permissive than the current physical presence rule.1 33
However, the burden of the regulatory requirement is not trivial; the
collector must undertake the cost of collecting the tax, and a major
component of the burden is the exposure to audit by the taxing state. 134
Audits can be costly and time-consuming, and may result in additional
liability for the collector. 135 These burdens are not necessarily greater in
scope than any other regulatory requirements, save one major detail with
respect to use tax collection obligations: Under current state laws, if a vendor
fails to collect the use tax, the vendor becomes jointly and severally liable for
the tax not collected, potentially increasing the burden on vendors greatly.1 36
Though the consumer also remains liable for the tax, 137 this penalty on a non-
collecting vendor effectively shifts the burden of the tax to the vendor
because states are loath to compel consumers to pay the tax and individual
128 Id. at 558.
129 See id. at 552-53.
130 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (observing that "contemporary
Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for
the first time today").
131 See Hartman, supra note 21, at 171 ("The tax itself is a burden on one engaged in
local use, but coerced collection has a direct impact only on one engaged in interstate
transactions .... [T]his collection aspect of the use tax has not given the Court much pause,
but in arriving at its conclusion that the collection method imposes no constitutional difficulty,
the Court often confuses valid taxability with constitutional collectability.").
132 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-
79 (1986).
13 Quill, 504 U.S. at 314 (observing that the state tax jurisprudence has moved in favor
of "more flexible balancing tests").
134 See id. at 313 n. 6.
135 See Baltz, supra note 62 and accompanying text.
136 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 212.12(5)(b); MN. STAT. § 289A.31, Subd. 7(a); N.Y. Tax Law
§ 1133(a); WASH. REv. CODE § 82.08.050(3).
137 E.g., N.Y. TAx LAw § 1133(b).
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consumers typically do not pay the taxes on their own. 138 The Court would
have to weigh these potential burdens - to which the vendor's physical
presence appears to have no relation1 39 - against the state's compelling
interest in tax collection to determine the validity of the use tax collection
obligation imposed.
B. Use Tax Collection Obligations as Taxes
Despite the argument for characterizing use tax collection obligations as
regulatory burdens and the Supreme Court's history of doing so, the Court
seems unlikely to do so today. The Court appears to have accepted that a tax
collection obligation (and the resulting potential for joint and several liability
for another person's tax liability) is the substantive equivalent of a tax itself,
at least for jurisdictional purposes. Quill applied tax standards to the use tax
collection obligation at issue, and Justice Scalia observed in his concurrence
that "[a]s an original matter, it might have been possible to distinguish
between jurisdiction to tax and jurisdiction to compel collection of taxes as
agent for the State, but we have rejected that." 1 4 0 This assumed equivalence
is not wholly unjustified; the collector is subject to audit risk by the state
taxing authority, and in a worst-case scenario, will bear the burden of the tax
to be collected. 14 1 Therefore, under the assumption that a use tax collection
obligation is the same in substance as a tax, the substance of that tax becomes
critical for jurisdictional purposes.
As noted, the Supreme Court demands that the substance of the tax
control the analysis of its constitutionality.1 42 To this end, the Court examines
who or what bears the economic burden of the tax.1 43 Quill and its forbearers
failed to examine the substance of use tax collection obligations when
reaching their conclusions - an analytical flaw throwing the reasoning of
those cases into question. Who the tax (i.e., the tax collection obligation)
burdens appears relatively straightforward; the burden of the tax is placed on
the collector.144 What bears the burden of the tax is less clear and could be
1 See Manzi, supra note 37.
1 See discussion in Part III.B.1.
140 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
141 See FLA. STAT. § 212.12(5)(b); MINN. STAT. § 289A.31, Subd. 7(a); N.Y. TAx LAW §
1133(a); WASH. REV. CODE § 82.08.050(3).
142 See supra note 125.
143 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
144 Of course, the collector may pass that tax along to the consumer through increased
prices, but because the collector is not required to, it will be assumed for the purposes of this
analysis that the burden falls on the collector. For discussions of how demand and supply
elasticities can affect the ability of a vendor to pass taxes along to customers, see Hayes R.
Holderness, The Unexpected Role of Tax Salience in State Competition for Businesses, 84 U.
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answered in at least two ways. First, it could be viewed as a tax on the
privilege of selling taxable things into the state. Second, it could be
characterized the same as the use tax itself, as a tax on the use of the thing
sold. Neither characterization demands a physical presence rule for
jurisdiction.
1. A Tax on the Privilege of Selling into the State
Characterizing a use tax collection obligation as a tax on the privilege of
selling into a state may seem odd at first glance, but there is a strong case to
make for such a characterization. The obligation on the vendor results not
from using the thing sold, but rather from the act of selling. As the National
Geographic court recognized, the burden of collecting the tax is separate
from the tax itself.1 45 In addition, the measure of the value of the tax is not
the actual use of the thing but rather its purchase price, which further
separates the tax from the use of the thing. 146
Taxes on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce - here,
engaging in selling over state lines -have had a schizophrenic constitutional
experience.1 47 The Supreme Court has waffled from denying the states any
right to impose such taxes to permitting the taxes subject to the prongs of the
Complete Auto test.148 As much as a quagmire as this area of jurisprudence
may have been, it is now clear that taxes on the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce are not per se unconstitutional.1 49
Characterizing use tax collection obligations as privilege taxes would
present the Supreme Court with an unresolved legal question. The Court has
not addressed the substantial nexus standard for privilege taxes, but a
physical presence rule ignores many of the aspects of selling into a state, such
as advertising and delivery in the state. Recognizing this, many state courts
have determined that a vendor's economic presence in the taxing state
Cm. L. REv. 1091, 1135-36 (2017); Walter Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense
to Unconstitution.l State Tax Discrimination, 39 TAx LAW. 405, 438-39 (1986).
145 National Geographic Soc'y v. Cal Equalization Bd., 430 U.S. 551, 558 (1977).
146 One might suspect an apportioned value of the actual use as the tax base if actual use
were the target of the tax. But see Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175
(1995) (finding that sales taxes did not need to be levied on an apportioned tax base to meet
the fair apportionment requirement of the Compete Auto test). Using purchase price as the tax
base may indicate that the tax is more closely linked to the act of selling. To be fair, this same
argument could be made against use taxes as taxes on the use of the product.
147 See PoMP, supra note 19, at 1-1 to 1-21.
148 Id.; see also Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279-87 (detailing the evolution of the Court's
approach to state taxes on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce).
149 See Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288-89 ("[Wie now reject the rule .. . that a state tax
on the 'privilege of doing business' is per se unconstitutional when it is applied to interstate
commerce .... ).
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satisfies the substantial nexus standard for privilege or income taxes. 150 Thus,
having intangible property or business activities in the state or having a
significant amount of sales into the state may be sufficient to create the
requisite nexus over the vendor.15 ' Further, even assuming a hard connection
is necessary, the activities of the vendor in the state would not need to be
related to the actual use of the thing sold in the state, any type of activity in
the state relating to selling, such as advertising or delivery, might justify the
imposition of a use tax collection obligation.1 52
2. A Tax on the Use of the Thing Sold
Alternatively, a use tax collection obligation could be characterized as
substantively a tax on the use of the thing sold. Given the mechanics of the
collection obligation, this characterization seems less grounded in reality; the
state is not compelling the vendor to collect the tax because the vendor used
the thing, rather the state imposes tax on the consumer because the consumer
uses the thing. Even so, the jurisprudence has tangled use tax collection
obligations and use taxes sufficiently enough to make such a characterization
likely.1 53
Characterizing a use tax collection obligation as a use tax for
jurisdictional purposes appears to strengthen the case for the physical
presence rule. The physical presence rule is the jurisdictional standard for the
imposition of sales taxes and seemingly for the imposition of use taxes (as
150 See supra note 6; see also generally Thimmesch, supra note 112 (analyzing the states'
economic presence nexus standards).
151 See, e.g., Geoffrey Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993) (finding
Commerce Clause nexus as the result of earning income from intellectual property used in the
state); Tax Commissioner v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 232 (W. Va. 2006)
(finding Commerce Clause nexus as the result of having a substantial economic presence in
the state). This article expresses no opinion regarding the validity ofeither of these approaches.
152 A potential constitutional snag for such a privilege tax is that the measure of the tax
is the purchase price of the thing sold, which may appear arbitrary. However, the Supreme
Court has declared that, pursuant to the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test, the measure
of a tax is constitutional so long as it is fairly related to the protections or benefits the taxpayer
receives from the state. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 625-26 (1981).
To say that this requirement is forgiving to the states is an understatement at best; the states
are given great flexibility to craft the measure of their taxes. See Edward A. Zelinsky &
Brannon P. Denning, Debate, The Future of the Dormant Commerce Clause: Abolishing the
Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 155 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 196, 206 (2007)
("Courts have heretofore been so reluctant to . . . apply ... the 'fairly related' prong of
Complete Auto [that it] has become a dead letter.") (comments of Brannon P. Denning).
Measuring a tax on the privilege of selling into a state by the purchase price of things sold into
the state can hardly be expected to run afoul of the Complete Auto test.
153 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992).
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detailed in the next part).1 54 If physical presence is the correct rule for use
taxes, then it would be the correct rule for a use tax collection obligation.
Though the case for physical presence as the rule with respect to the
imposition of sales tax is relatively clear - the tax is on the in-state transfer
of title or possession, thus requiring some in-state presence 55 - the case for
physical presence as the rule for use taxes is less clear.
This lack of clarity results from the lack of thorough analysis justifying
the extension of the physical presence rule for sales taxes to use taxes.
Instead, the Supreme Court brought about this extension by assuming the
equivalence of sales taxes and use taxes for jurisdictional purposes,
effectively ignoring the full range of activities that use taxes fall on and
focusing the jurisdictional inquiry on only that portion of taxable "use" that
corresponds with sales - the in-state transfer of title or possession. With this
assumption in place, the physical presence rule for use taxes was basically a
foregone conclusion.
Thus, the Supreme Court turned a condition it had deemed sufficient for
use tax jurisdiction - physical presence - into one necessary for such
jurisdiction. Challenging the reflexive tying of the substance of use taxes to
that of sales taxes and highlighting the full range of activities that a use tax
covers further exposes weaknesses in the reasoning behind the physical
presence rule. The next part examines how use taxes were pushed into the
legal shadow of sales taxes, resulting in the physical presence rule for use
taxes.
C. Trivializing Use Taxes
Use taxes and sales taxes are undeniably related. 156 Use taxes were
adopted subsequent to or contemporaneously with sales taxes as an equalizer
of tax burdens on products purchased in-state and those purchased out-of-
state and as a backstop against lost sales tax revenues. 157 To prevent double
taxation of the same product, states allow a credit against use taxes for any
154 See McLeod v. JE Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944) (requiring a sale to take place
in the taxing state before it can be subjected to a sales tax); Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944) (finding the appropriate nexus to levy a use tax on
property when the property is used within the taxing state).
155 See JE Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327; see also, e.g. N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1101(b)(5), 1105
(defining sale as the transfer of title or possession and imposing sales tax on retail sales).
156 See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
1 See PoMP, supra note 19, at 6-39; see also E.E. McLees, The Use Tax After One Year,
4 ARK. L. REv. 337, 337-39 (1950) (describing the intention and operation of the then newly-
adopted Arkansas Use Tax). This backstop also serves to protect states' ability to pursue their
policy goals unimpeded by the actions of other states. See supra note 35 and accompanying
text.
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other sales taxes and use taxes applied to the product.15 8 As a technical matter
then, both a sales tax and a use tax apply to the product when constitutionally
permissible, but the use tax is diminished by the sales tax imposed. 159
Therefore, sales taxes rise to the primary level of taxation between the two,
in the sense that use taxes give way to sales taxes through the credit
mechanisms. 160
Given that use taxes were designed as complements to sales taxes, it may
appear completely benign, even appropriate, for use tax jurisdictional
standards to exist in the shadow of sales tax standards. However, as the
following discussion indicates, the Supreme Court has only explicitly
demanded equivalence between sales taxes and use taxes in the context of
deciding whether the taxes discriminate against interstate commerce. 161
Though the Court ultimately pronounced the same nexus standard for both
types of taxes - physical presence - it has never stated that the taxes must
be considered equivalent for jurisdictional purposes. There is room for
different nexus standards for sales taxes and use taxes because the two taxes
have a significant difference: sales taxes typically fall only on the transfer of
title to or possession of a taxable item, whereas use taxes fall on all uses of
the taxable item, including the delivery, storage, and consumption of the
item. 162 In short, use taxes fall on a broader range of activities. Even if the
158 POMP, supra note 19, at 6-39.
159 id.
160 Whether this arrangement should be so has long been a topic of debate. See, e.g., Int'l
Harvester Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 361 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("If... it were necessary to choose between the state of origin and that
of market for the exercise of exclusive power to tax, or for requiring allowance of credit in
order to avoid the cumulative burden, in my opinion the choice should lie in favor of the state
of market rather than the state of origin.").
161 See Sandra B. McCray, Commerce Clause Sanctions Against Taxation on Mail Order
Sales: A Re-Evaluation, 17 URB. LAW. 529, 562-64 (1985) (discussing the complementary
nature of sales and use taxes and the resulting demands of the Commerce Clause).
162 E.g., compare N.Y. TAX LAW § 1105 (imposing sales tax on "every retail sale of
tangible personal property"), with N.Y. TAx LAW I 1110 (imposing use tax on "the use within
this state ... of any tangible personal property"). N.Y. Tax Law § 1 101(b)(5) defines "sale"
as "[a]ny transfer of title or possession or both, exchange or barter, rental, lease or license to
use or consume (including, with respect to computer software, merely the right to reproduce),
conditional or otherwise, in any manner or by any means whatsoever for a consideration, or
any agreement therefor, including the rendering of any service, taxable under this article, for
a consideration or any agreement therefor." N.Y. Tax Law § 1101 (b)(7) defines "use" as "[t]he
exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property . .. and includes, but is not
limited to, the receiving, storage or any keeping or retention for any length of time, withdrawal
from storage, any installation, any affixation to real or personal property, or any consumption
of such property ..... Compare also the definitions of "sales tax" and of "use tax" contained
in the Multistate Tax Compact, an agreement among certain states to standardize their tax
systems. A "sales tax" is defined as "a tax imposed with respect to the transfer for a
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two types of taxes should be characterized as equivalent taxes on
consumption, use taxes would seem the appropriate taxes to set the
substantial nexus rule as the taxes that more accurately map onto
consumption. However, the Supreme Court's use tax jurisprudence has
effectively ignored the full scope of use taxes for jurisdictional purposes by
shifting use taxes from the perceived equal of sales taxes to the ward of sales
taxes, dependent on such taxes for their substance and existence.
1. The Foundational Sales and Use Tax Cases - Sales Taxes and Use
Taxes Are Different
Three Supreme Court cases did much to lay the foundation for how the
constitutional jurisprudence characterizes the substance of use taxes, with
two primary views informing that substance arising: first, a view of use taxes
as anti-sales-tax-avoidance measures; and second, a view of use taxes as
independent taxes on the use of property or the right to use property.' 63 These
cases are Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,' McLeod v. JE Dilworth Co., 165
and General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission oflowa.166
Silas Mason arguably did little to define the substance of use taxes, at
best giving credence to either formulation and instead focusing on whether
the interaction between Washington's "compensating [use] tax" and its retail
sales tax resulted in unconstitutional taxation. To begin, the Court clearly
affirmed that use taxation is a valid form of taxation, the use of property being
a part of the bundle of property rights which a state has the authority to tax
(provided the use occurs in the state). 167 The Court did indicate that a use tax
is something independent of a sales tax, except perhaps when the use taxed
consideration of ownership, possession or custody of tangible personal property or the
rendering of services measured by the price of the tangible personal property transferred or
services rendered ..... MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT, art. II, cl. 7. A "use tax" is defined as
a nonrecurring tax, other than a sales tax, which (a) is imposed on or with respect
to the exercise or enjoyment of any right or power over tangible personal property
incident to the ownership, possession or custody of that property or the leasing of
that property from another including any consumption, keeping, retention, or other
use of tangible personal property and (b) is complementary to a sales tax.
Id. at art. II, cl. 8.
163 See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Sales and Use Tax Credits, Discrimination
Against Interstate Commerce, and the Useless Multiple Tax Concept, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
273, 278 (1987) (describing the two justifications for use taxes).
164 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
165 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
166 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
167 Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 582.
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is "so closely connected with delivery as to be in substance a part thereof,"
in which case the tax "might be subject to the same objections that would be
applicable to a tax upon the sale itself."1 68 However, in describing the
Washington tax, the Court observed that "[e]quality is the theme that runs
through all the sections of the statute. There shall be a tax upon the use, but
subject to an offset if another use or sales tax has been paid for the same
thing." 69 This description painted the Washington use tax as an anti-sales-
tax-avoidance measure, with the Court concluding that "[i]n substance what
[Washington] says is this: You may ship your goods in such amounts and at
such prices as you please, but the goods when used in Washington after the
transit is completed, will share an equal burden with goods that have been
purchased here."' 70 Even so, this description was made in the context of
deciding that Washington's system of taxation did not discriminate against
interstate commerce, and the Court clarified that Washington's system of
sales and use tax credits may not have been necessary to meet the
constitutional standard: "A taxing act is not invalid because its exemptions
are more generous than the state would have been free to make them by
exerting the full measure of her power."1 7 1
The JE Dilworth and General Trading cases are often thought of as
companions and address when a state has the constitutional nexus required to
impose a sales tax or a use tax on a transaction. 172 Both cases had similar fact
patterns: the taxing state sought to impose a tax - a sales tax in the case of
JE Dilworth and a use tax in the case of General Trading - on property sold
outside of the state and then sent into that state for use there.1 73 The sales
168 Id. at 583.
169 Id. at 583-84. The Court continued:
No one who uses property in Washington after buying it at retail is to be exempt
from a tax upon the privilege of enjoyment except to the extent that he has paid a
use or sales tax somewhere. Everyone who has paid a use or sales tax anywhere,
or, more accurately, in any state, is to that extent to be exempt from the payment
of another tax in Washington. When the account is made up, the stranger from afar
is subject to no greater burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller
within the gates. The one pays upon one activity or incident, and the other upon
another, but the sum is the same when the reckoning is closed .... If the sales tax
were abolished, the buyer in Washington would pay at once upon the use. He would
have no longer an offsetting credit.
Id. at 584.
170 Id. at 586.
"' Id. at 587.
172 See Pomp, supra note 15, at 1125-26.
In McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 328 (1944); Gen. Trading Co. v. State
Tax Comm'n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335, 337 (1944).
348 [Vol. 37:313
Questioning Quill
were solicited, at least partially, by travelling salesmen of the vendors in the
taxing states. Fully displaying that sales taxes and use taxes are different
types of taxes, the Supreme Court found in JE Dilworth that Arkansas had
no authority to impose a sales tax on sales of property made in Tennesseel 74
but found in General Trading that Iowa could impose a use tax on the use of
property sold in Minnesota. 175
Indeed, the Court's discussion in JE Dilworth demonstrates a view that
sales taxes and use taxes must be analyzed independently of each other for
nexus purposes (i.e., that a use tax should not be viewed solely as an anti-
sales-tax-avoidance measure in this context):
It is suggested, however, that Arkansas could have levied a tax of
the same amount on the use of these goods in Arkansas by the
Arkansas buyers, and that such a use tax would not exceed the limits
upon state power derived from the United States Constitution.
Whatever might be the fate of such a tax were it before us, the not
too short answer is that Arkansas has chosen not to impose such a
use tax, as its Supreme Court so emphatically found. A sales tax and
a use tax in many instances may bring about the same result. But
they are different in conception, are assessments upon different
transactions, and in the interlacings of the two legislative authorities
within our federation may have to justify themselves on different
constitutional grounds. A sales tax is a tax on the freedom of
purchase - a freedom which wartime restrictions serve to
emphasize. A use tax is a tax on the enjoyment of that which was
purchased .... Thus we are not dealing with matters of
nomenclature even though they be matters of nicety. 176
In contrast, the discussion in General Trading did not even approach the
comparison between sales taxes and use taxes on the nexus issue, as the Court
clearly was comfortable with Iowa's right to impose a use tax on the property
purchased in Minnesota and used in Iowa.1 77 The General Trading Court
relied on earlier decisions to find that the solicitation of business in the state
was sufficient to establish Iowa's right to require the Minnesota vendor to
174 McLeod, 322 U.S. at 330 ("We would have to destroy both business and legal notions
to deny that under these circumstances the sale - the transfer of ownership - was made in
Tennessee. For Arkansas to impose a tax on such transaction would be to project its powers
beyond its boundaries and to tax an interstate transaction.").
'' Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338-39.
176 McLeod, 322 U.S. at 330-31.
177 Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 337 ("In view, however, of the clear understanding by
the court below that the facts we have summarized bring the transaction within the taxing
power of Iowa, there is little need for elaboration.").
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collect use taxes on the products it sold into the state. 178 Interestingly, the
Court's remaining discussion in the case focused heavily on Iowa's right to
impose a use tax and less on the state's right to require the out-of-state vendor
to collect the tax:
[T]he mere fact that property is used for interstate commerce or has
come into an owner's possession as a result of interstate commerce
does not diminish the protection which he may draw from a State to
the upkeep of which he may be asked to bear his fair share .... The
exaction is made against the ultimate consumer - the Iowa resident
who is paying taxes to sustain his own state government. To make
the distributor the tax collector for the State is a familiar and
sanctioned device.1 79
Justice Jackson, in dissent, picked up on this apparent analytical brush
over, criticizing the Court for cavalierly extending the state's power to
"subject persons to its taxing power who are not within its jurisdiction and
have not in any manner submitted themselves to it." 180 Justice Jackson
admitted that a "state may make tax collectors of those who come in and do
business within its jurisdiction,"181 but disagreed that the precedents the
Court relied on supported the decision in General Trading. In his view, an
out-of-state vendor that "never qualified in Iowa and has no office, branch,
warehouse, or general agent in the State" does not receive any benefit or right
from the state sufficient to create nexus with the state. 182 Justice Jackson did
not explain why he thought the presence of the vendor's salesmen in Iowa
was not enough to create nexus, but presumably he believed the salesmen
were not "general agent[s]" of the vendor, and that their presence in Iowa
thus could not be attributed to the vendor.1 83
' Id. at 337-38 ("We agree with the Iowa Supreme Court that Felt & Tarrant Co. v.
Gallagher; Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.; and Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co. are
controlling. The Gallagher case is indistinguishable - certainly nothing can turn on the more
elaborate arrangements for soliciting orders for an intricate machine for shipment from without
a State as in the Gallagher case, compared with the apparently simpler needs for soliciting
business in this case.") (internal citations omitted).
179 Id. at 338-39.
iso Id. at 339 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
'' Id.
182 Id.; accord Holderness, supra note 38 (arguing that the Due Process Clause requires
that a person receive benefits from a state before the state may constitutionally subject it to
tax).
183 This conclusion would be precarious under current precedent, which permits the
presence of an in-state person to be attributed to an out-of-state person if the in-state person is
acting in the state on the behalf of the out-of-state person to establish and maintain a market
in the state for the out-of-state person. See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of
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2. A Strict Rule of Equality: Halliburton
In 1963, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of use taxes in
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily.1 84 Halliburton was not a nexus
case, instead the question presented was whether the Louisiana use tax, which
followed the "basic pattern" of the Washington use tax considered in Silas
Mason, 8 5 discriminated against interstate commerce. In finding that the tax
did discriminate against interstate commerce, the Court interpreted Silas
Mason as requiring "equal treatment for instate and out-of-state taxpayers
similarly situated [as] the condition precedent for a valid use tax on goods
imported from out-of-state."l 86 Because the Court found - perhaps
mistakenlyl 87 - that the Louisiana use tax placed a higher burden on out-of-
state people than the sales tax placed on in-state people, it concluded that
there was "no reason to depart from the strict rule ofequality adopted in Silas
Mason, and ... that the Louisiana use tax as applied to the appellant's
specialized equipment discriminates against interstate commerce."1 88
Though the result, given the findings, appears facially justified, it requires an
assumption that underlies how many view use taxes today: they are assumed
to be solely complements to sales taxes and thus must be considered together
with them. This assumption led to the "strict rule of equality" between sales
taxes and use taxes that the Court believed Silas Mason adopted.
The concurrence and dissent in Halliburton appear to take varying
degrees of issue with this assumption and the resulting strict rule of equality.
Justice Brennan, in concurrence, observed that the unconstitutionality of the
application of Louisiana's use tax did not "flow from any duty upon the States
to ensure absolute equality of economic burden as between sales and use
taxpayers."' 89 However, Justice Brennan did conclude that the states could
not impose different rates of taxation on the use and sale of property without
discriminating against interstate commerce. 190 Most importantly, Justice
Brennan stated that to fix the discrimination he found in Louisiana's tax
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250 (1987) ("[T]he crucial factor governing nexus is whether the
activities performed in this state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with the
taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in this state for the sales.") (internal
citations omitted); see also Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
184 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
18 Id. at 65.
'8 Id. at 70.
187 The Court's analysis failed to consider how a vendor might price parts and labor into
a good; if it had, it might have concluded that the burdens of the Louisiana sales tax and use
tax were substantially the same.
* Halliburton, 373 U.S. at 73 (emphasis added).
189 Id. at 76 (Brennan, J., concurring).
190 Id. at 77.
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scheme, the state did not have to equalize the two taxes' bases; it only had to
apply the taxes to all similarly-situated taxpayers. In so saying, he noted that
there was a second justification for use taxes beyond merely "offset[ting] the
effect of sales taxes imposed on in-state purchasers, and thereby to deter
domestic consumers from seeking to evade the sales tax by purchasing out of
state."1 91 That justification was that a use tax is a valid levy on "the privilege
of use after commerce is at an end." 1 92 Thus, Justice Brennan exposed the
conflict between viewing use taxes as anti-sales-tax-avoidance measures and
independent taxes. Justice Clark, on the other hand, dissented from the
Court's holding, further rejecting the notion that use taxes are solely
complements to sales taxes. "The fallacy of the Court's holding is that it
ignores the incidence of the tax in Louisiana's Tax Act. That incidence is the
moment that the product becomes a part of the mass of property within the
State."' 93 Under Justice Clark's view, the use tax is separate from the sales
tax and the use tax should apply to property when it is first used in the state,
regardless of what the sales tax is applied to. Justice Clark accused the
majority of changing the incidence of the use tax by requiring uniformity
with the sales tax, which would necessitate taxing each component part of
the product used separately rather than simply taxing the product used in its
entirety. 194
The tension between the two potential views of use taxes is evident in
Halliburton, but the Court stuck with the view that use taxes primarily serve
a complementary role to sales taxes and must follow their lead. This move
easily may have been the result of the states presenting their use taxes as
complementary to their sales taxes. 195 But as the concurrence and dissent in
Halliburton demonstrate, this did not have to be the case; use taxes could be
viewed as a form of taxation independent from sales taxes which would have
allowed the jurisdictional standard for imposing use taxes to develop on its
own. Tied to sales taxes, use taxes never had a chance.
3. The Resulting Physical Presence Rule
Though not directly evident in the holdings, the strict rule of equality
I91 Id.
192 Id. (internal citations omitted).
193 Id. at 79 (Clark, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 79-80.
195 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 7203 ("The use tax portion of any sales and use
tax ordinance adopted under this part shall impose a complementary tax .... ); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-164.6 (imposing a "complementary use tax"); W. VA. CODE § 11-15A-la(1) ("It
is the intent of the Legislature that the use tax imposed by the provisions of article fifteen-a
and the consumers sales tax imposed by the provisions of article fifteen of this chapter be
complementary laws.. . .").
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arising from the assumption that the nature of use taxes was the prevention
of the erosion of sales tax bases informed the adoption of the physical
presence test for use tax collection nexus through Bellas Hess 1 96 and Quill.' 97
In Bellas Hess, the Court considered the authority of Illinois to require an
out-of-state taxpayer to collect use taxes on property sold into the state. 198
The taxpayer was a mail-order vendor with no physical buildings, salesmen,
or other property in the state, other than catalogs and other mailings to Illinois
residents. 199 It shipped all of its products to its Illinois residents through mail
or common carrier. 20 0 In language that served as the genesis for the physical
presence rule, the Court determined that:
In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens
on National in this case, we would have to repudiate totally the sharp
distinction which these and other decisions have drawn between
mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a
State, and those who do no more than communicate with customers
in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate
business. But this basic distinction, which until now has been
generally recognized by the state taxing authorities, is a valid one,
and we decline to obliterate it.20 1
By simply relying on earlier use tax cases involving vendors with
physical presence in the taxing state to reach its conclusion, the Court passed
up an opportunity to more intricately consider the type of contacts with a state
that could establish use tax nexus. 202 The Court was correct to observe that
physical presence was found in almost all of these earlier cases, but failed to
explain that only once before Bellas Hess had it considered a vendor without
traditional physical presence.20 3 In that case, Miller Brothers v. Maryland,
the Court did not find due process nexus, so the physical presence question
196 Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
197 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
198 For an excellent dissection of the Bellas Hess case, see Pomp, supra note 15, at 1133-
40.
199 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754-55.
200 Id. at 754.
201 Id. at 758.
202 See Morey Stephen Rosenbloom, Use Taxation-A "National" Dilemma, 41 TEMP.
L.Q. 240, 245-46 (1968) (noting the missed opportunity in Bellas Hess to fully analyze the
company's connections with the taxing state).
203 See Hartman, supra note 21, at 172 ("It was a 'familiar and sanctioned device' to
make the out-of-state seller serve as a collector when he had localized himself by operating
through a retail outlet within the taxing state . . . but it was neither familiar nor had it been
sanctioned when this was not the situation.").
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was moot.204 The Bellas Hess Court instead relied on its conclusion that "this
basic distinction ... has been generally recognized by the state taxing
authorities." 20 5 No doubt this conclusion was eased by the perception of use
taxes as mere complements to sales taxes embraced by Halliburton - under
JE Dilworth, physical presence was clearly necessary for the imposition of a
sales tax.
The result in Bellas Hess may have been the same had the Court given
the question of use tax nexus without traditional physical presence a harder
look, but it very well could have been different, as Justice Fortas's dissent in
the case indicates. Justice Fortas was unconvinced by the Court's standard,
observing that "[t]here should be no doubt that this large-scale, systematic,
continuous solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market is a
sufficient 'nexus' to require Bellas Hess to collect from Illinois customers
and to remit the use tax." 20 6 In his view, National Bellas Hess had received
numerous benefits from Illinois, which justified the state's jurisdiction over
the company. National Bellas Hess "regularly and continuously engaged in
'exploitation of the consumer market' of Illinois" and "could not carry on its
business in Illinois, and particularly its substantial credit business, without
utilizing Illinois banking and credit facilities." 207 In short, "Bellas Hess
enjoys the benefits of, and profits from the facilities nurtured by, the State of
Illinois as fully as if it were a retail store or maintained salesmen therein."20 8
In effect, the refusal of the majority in the Bellas Hess case to consider
more rigorously the substance of use taxes limited the substance to that of
sales taxes - taxes on the immediate sales transaction in the state for the
good sold. But use taxes apply to a larger range of activities; the activity taxed
is not merely the transfer of title to or possession of the product but also the
other uses of the product.209 A remote vendor might have the requisite
connection with those other activities to constitutionally be required to collect
the use taxes, but the Bellas Hess Court's dismissive opinion prevented the
204 Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 347 (1954) (finding no due process nexus
between the taxpayer and taxing state and observing that therefore "we need not consider
whether the statute imposes an unjustifiable burden upon interstate commerce"). For a
dissection of the Miller Brothers case, the faults within it, and what might have been equal in
excellence to his dissection of the Bellas Hess case, see Pomp, supra note 15, at 1121-32. Of
particular relevance here, Pomp - as well as the dissent in Miller Brothers - chides the
majority's characterization of the continued presence of Miller Brothers' own truck in
Maryland, which should have been more than enough to establish a physical presence in the
state, as "occasional." See id. at 1130-31, 1154-55.
205 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
206 Id. at 761 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 762.
208 id.
209 See supra note 162.
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analysis of that question. Physical presence may be necessary for a sale, but
it is not clear that physical presence would be necessary for other taxable
uses.
Quill represents the current law with respect to states' jurisdiction to
impose use taxes (as well as jurisdiction to impose use tax collection
obligations).2 10 In Quill the Court considered whether North Dakota could
require Quill Corporation, a remote vendor, 2 11 to collect the state's use tax
on the products it sold into the state. Relying heavily on the principle of stare
decisis, the Court ultimately sustained the physical presence rule it gleaned
from Bellas Hess but characterized the rule as flowing from the requirements
of the Commerce Clause, not the Due Process Clause, again failing to
consider the substance of the tax.2 12 This result changed little as a practical
matter for remote vendors, but did clearly open the door for Congress to
change the rule. 213 Needless to say, if Justice Fortas's view in Bellas Hess
had prevailed, Quill would not exist today in its current form.
V. REEXAMINING PHYSICAL PRESENCE
The above analysis demonstrates weaknesses in the reasoning
underlying the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Commerce Clause
requires a person to have a physical presence in a state before the state can
require the person to collect and pay the state's use tax. The Court failed to
explain why the Commerce Clause requires any type of connection between
the taxing state and the taxpayer, failed to consider the nature of use tax
collection obligations, and relied on a conclusory assumption of the
equivalence of sales taxes and use taxes in adopting the physical presence
rule. These analytical gaps offer strength to the Kill Quill movement's calls
to reexamine the rule.2 14
210 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1992) ("In sum, although in our
cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning other types of taxes we have not adopted a
similar bright-line, physical-presence requirement, our reasoning in those cases does not
compel that we now reject the rule that Bellas Hess established in the area of sales and use
taxes.") (emphasis added).
211 Quill Corp.'s status as a remote vendor is not entirely evident from the facts of the
case, but the Supreme Court treated Quill as having no physical presence in North Dakota. See
supra note 50 and accompanying text.
212 Quill, 504 U.S. at 317-18.
213 Id. at 318 ("[I]n recent years Congress has considered legislation that would 'overrule'
the Bellas Hess rule. Its decision not to take action in this direction may, of course, have been
dictated by respect for our holding in Bellas Hess that the Due Process Clause prohibits States
from imposing such taxes, but today we have put that problem to rest. Accordingly, Congress
is now free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-
order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.").
214 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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However, the Supreme Court will not necessarily be quick to change the
physical presence rule despite the weaknesses in its foundations. As noted,
the Court has articulated reasons for the rule beyond those that flow from
reducing undue burdens on interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause.2 15 Perhaps the strongest rationale for continuing to leave the rule in
place is the Court's opinion that Congress is the appropriate federal actor to
dismantle the physical presence rule. 2 16 Critics of this position have argued
that the Court cannot abdicate its responsibility for correcting harmful
decisions by passing the buck to a Congress that is unwilling or unable to
act.2 17 Given that the Court has granted certiorari in the Wayfair case,2 18 it
appears that those critics have won the Court over. The following parts
suggest potential actions the Kill Quill movement could take to convince the
Court reexamine the physical presence rule, and then suggest what a more
fundamentally sound substantial nexus rule might look like.
A. Getting the Supreme Court's Attention
To bring the Supreme Court's attention to the physical presence rule's
problems, the Kill Quill movement could take steps to highlight Quill's
analytical gaps and facilitate a direct challenge to the rule, or alternatively
could attempt to play off of the gaps to make current use tax obligations
distinguishable from those considered in Quill. In any direct challenge to the
Quill decision, the Kill Quill movement should assume that use tax
obligations will be considered the same as use taxes and that the Commerce
Clause requires a hard connection between the taxpayer and the activity
taxed, as these are the positions most adverse to overturning the physical
presence rule (a no connection or soft connection regime would clearly not
necessitate physical presence, and the alternative characterizations of use tax
collection obligations pull them away from Quill's reach). Having made
these assumptions, the movement must attack the assumption that use taxes
are subordinate to sales taxes and could take actions to upset the balance
between sales taxes and use taxes in order to facilitate that attack.
Alternatively, if the current direct challenge or others fail, the Kill Quill
215 See Swain, supra note 26, at 357-65 (articulating three "faces of Quill" - "stare
decisis Quill, burdens Quill, and disappearing ink Quill - which depend on different
rationales); Thimmesch, supra note 9, at 381-88 (examining and critiquing Professor Swain's
three faces of Quill).
216 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 ("[Retaining the physical presence rule] is made easier by
the fact that the underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be better qualified to
resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve.").
217 Brief of Interested Law Professors as Amici Curiae supporting Petitioner at 19, Brohl
v. Direct Mktg. Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 593 (2016) (No. 16-458).
218 See supra note 8.
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movement could attempt to move past Quill by altering aspects of use tax
collection obligations. For instance, states could alter the burdens associated
with the obligations to collect their use taxes in order to more clearly
demonstrate that such obligations are regulatory burdens, not taxes.
Additionally, if use tax collection obligations are characterized as taxes,
states could take action to indicate that such taxes are privilege taxes, not
taxes on the use of the property sold. These potential actions are considered
further in the following subparts.
1. Use Taxes as Their Own Thing
Removing use taxes from the shadow of sales taxes would offer the
Supreme Court the opportunity to reexamine the nexus standard that applies
to use taxes. Assuming a hard connection between the taxpayer and the
activity taxed is required under the Commerce Clause, the Kill Quill
movement can open the door to the examination of a vendor's potential in-
state activities relating to the use of a product sold by returning the Court's
attention to use taxes as stand-alone taxes. These activities are not necessarily
dependent on the vendor having a physical presence in the state - for
instance, delivery from out-of-state or advertising in the state may qualify;
therefore, focusing on the substance of use taxes may provide a strong path
for challenging the physical presence rule.
Perhaps the most palatable and promising actions the Kill Quill
movement could take would be actions attempting to establish use taxes as
not wholly dependent on sales taxes. Potentially, the Kill Quill movement
need not do anything other than draw attention to the analytical gaps in the
jurisprudence. As noted earlier, two primary views of the nature of use taxes
emerge in the jurisprudence: first, as anti-sales-tax-avoidance measures; and
second, as stand-alone taxes on the use of property or the right to use
property.219 By the time Bellas Hess was decided, the first view had arisen
as the dominant view. Thus, the Bellas Hess Court showed no desire to
evaluate the use tax nexus standard separate from that for sales taxes:
physical presence. The view of use taxes as primarily anti-sales-tax-
avoidance measures went unchallenged in Quill. In fact, only five of the
twenty-two briefs filed in Quill, including those of the litigants and the amici
curiae, even alluded to that characterization at all.220 No briefs argued that
219 See supra Part IV.C..
220 Brieffor Respondent, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (No. 91-194),
1991 LEXIS 667; Brief of the National Governor's Association, National Conference of State
Legislatures, Council of State Governments, National Association of Counties, International
City/County Management Association, National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, U.S.
Conference of Mayors, and National League of Cities as Amici Curiae supporting Respondent,
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (No.91-194), 1991 LEXIS 666; Brief of the
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use taxes are substantively a separate form of taxation from sales taxes and
should be considered that way when determining the nexus standard that
applies to them. The Court did not raise the issue in its decision. The Kill
Quill movement could raise it now.22 1
If the movement fails to get the result it wants in South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., and wanted to enhance its ability to raise this issue, Kill Quill
states could drop sales taxes altogether,222 cementing the substance of their
use taxes as independent from sales taxes. If states had taken this approach
from the beginning, one wonders if the physical presence rule would ever had
arisen or if individual consumers would not comply with their use tax
International Council of Shopping Centers, Inc., National Association of Retail Druggists,
Inc., National Association of Retail Dealers of America, Inc., National Home Furnishings
Association, Inc., Jewelers of American, Inc., American Floorcovering Association, Marine
Retailers Association of America, Arizona Retailers Association, Colorado Retail Council,
Connecticut Retail Merchants Association, Florida Retail Federation, Idaho Retailers
Association, Michigan Retailers Association, Inc., Nebraska Retail Federation, North Dakota
Retail Association, Ohio Council of Retail Merchants, South Dakota Retailers Association,
Texas Retailers Association, Volunteer Office Products Association, Inc., Fortunoff
Department Stores, Plunkett Furniture Co., Wayside Furniture Store, A&W Office Supply,
B&B Office Supply, Inc., Creswell Office Supply Co., Inc., Office Supply & Equipment Co.,
Phillips Office Supplies, Inc., Smith Office Products, and Smith Office Supply, Inc., as Amici
Curiae supporting Respondent, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (No. 91-
194), 1991 LEXIS 664; Brief for the State of New Mexico as Amicus Curiae supporting
Respondent, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (No. 91-194), 1991 LEXIS
662; Brief Amicus Curiae for the State of New Jersey supporting Respondent, Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 US. 298 (1992) (No. 91-194), 1991 LEXIS 541.
221 As of this writing, it does not appear that the issue has been raised in the South Dakota
v. Wayfair, Inc. case which has been granted certiorari, see supra note 13.
222 Though eliminating sales taxes in favor of use taxes may seem radical, the idea was
suggested and discussed in the early days of the use tax.
[I]t has been suggested that the sales tax should be given up and the use tax taken
as the sole method of collecting this class of revenue . . . . If then the choice is
between these two taxes, it seems more desirable to retain the use tax and do away
with the sales tax . . . . The choice which has been discussed seems, however, a
quite unrealistic one. Why, as between a sales and a use tax, may not a state choose
both? While a sales tax has perhaps no theoretical advantage over a use tax, yet
experience makes it fairly clear that it is under some circumstances practically more
desirable, at least from the standpoint of collection procedure. It is submitted,
therefore, that the states should retain the use tax, and furthermore that there is no
necessity of their giving up the sales tax, which may at times have important
advantages . . . . To give up either is not necessary or desirable.
Brown, supra note 21, at 505. See also Eugene Greener, Jr., The Use Tax: Its Relationship to
the Sales Tax, 9 VAND. L. REV. 349, 355 (1956); Herbert David Blair, Comment,
Compensating Use Taxes: Past and Present Constitutional Problems in Imposition and
Collection, 18 ARK. L. REV. 321, 323 (1964).
358 [Vol. 37:313
Questioning Quill
obligations when vendors do not collect the taxes. Use taxes are already
collected today at the point of sale on the assumption that they will be used
in the taxing state,223 so there appears to be little technically standing in the
way of a state eliminating sales taxes and only applying use taxes to products
sold (though one expects the political obstacles may be quite large). This
observation further demonstrates that use taxes have substance beyond their
connection to sales taxes.
A less extreme action would be to shift the use tax credit scheme the
states currently employ. Rather than offering credits against the use tax for
sales taxes collected, states could offer credits against sales taxes for use taxes
collected. Practical difficulties might arise under this course of action when
the use tax is collected on a use after the sale, but refund mechanisms could
be developed to ease those difficulties.224 This action should have the effect
of elevating use taxes to the primary tax between sales taxes and use taxes,
removing use taxes from the sales tax shadow.225
At a minimum, a state wishing to challenge Quill should stop calling its
use tax complementary to its sales tax.226 Such semantics would not change
the underlying substance of sales taxes and use taxes, but should add to the
credibility of a state seeking to reexamine the substance of use taxes.
2. Changing the Burdens of Use Tax Collection Obligations
Alternatively, the Kill Quill movement could leave Quill alone should it
survive the Wayfair case and alter use tax collection obligations enough to
remove them from the decision's scope. Changing the burdens associated
with use tax collection obligations has the potential to significantly affect
their characterization. In order to paint such obligations as regulatory burdens
subject to Pike balancing and not the Complete Auto test (and thus not Quill),
states could change the penalties imposed on noncollecting vendors and
lighten the audit burden placed on vendors. 227 Decoupling the penalties
imposed on a noncollecting vendor from the uncollected taxes would send a
strong signal that the substance of the obligation is not the same as the tax
itself. However, such an action would likely be resisted by states; it would
grant vendors the ability to avoid tax collection if the penalties were too low
223 See Pomp, supra note 15, at 1129.
224 See id.
225 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
226 See supra note 22.
227 See Rosenbloom, supra note 202, at 247-49 (advocating the reduction of burdens on
the collector to achieve a more appropriate balance under the Commerce Clause of the states'
interests and the burden on the national economy (Rosenbloom's piece was written before the
Complete Auto test was adopted, so presumably the Court was expected to take a balancing
approach)).
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or it would impose a greater burden than the taxes themselves if the penalties
were too high. Even so, imposing criminal penalties for intentionally failing
to obey the law may lead to more compliance than would be expected if civil
penalties were the only ones imposed.
States could also relieve vendors of audit risks by providing a safe harbor
set of activities for vendors to meet, shifting the audit risk to customers. For
instance, the state could provide a set of guidelines - or compliance software
- that if used would immunize a vendor from audits for uncollected taxes.
States could demand information reports from vendors similar to those in
Colorado's reporting regime, 228 and use such information to audit customers
instead of the vendor. True, some administrative costs would remain as
vendors would need to show they met the safe harbors, but removing the tax
audit risk from vendors would remove one of the primary tax-like burdens
placed on them, and thus would cause use tax collection obligations to more
closely resemble regulatory burdens. Such actions might also meet resistance
from the states, but may be more palatable than the current situation because
there would be some minimum level of use tax collection.
3. Use Tax Collection Obligations as Privilege Taxes
Assuming that the Kill Quill movement is unable or unwilling to make
changes to clarify that use tax collection obligations are regulatory burdens
and not taxes, the movement could take actions to characterize the taxes as
privilege taxes and not use taxes, potentially removing the obligations from
the scope of Quill.229 One way to accomplish this goal would be to remove
any statutory imposition of use taxes on customers, while retaining the
vendor's ability to pass the tax along. The use tax itself thus could be
recharacterized as a tax owed by the vendor for selling into the state. A
slightly less aggressive action would be to remove provisions relieving
customers of their obligations to pay use tax when the vendor pays the tax.
These actions would indicate that the tax imposed on the vendor is separate
from that imposed on the customer's use of the goods sold.
These actions are likely to be difficult to achieve, particularly the first
set. In essence, the first set of actions would impose new taxes on vendors
and thus may be met with strong political resistance. The second set of
actions may be more palatable, however. Customers may be upset at the idea
that they would not get credit for use taxes paid by the vendor, but there is
little to indicate that states would begin enforcing customers' tax obligations
after such a change. States currently find themselves unable to do so, 230 and
228 See CoLo. REV. STAT. §39-21-112.3.5 (2017).
229 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
230 See Manzi, supra note 138.
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in this changed scenario, they would be receiving the taxes they are missing
out upon now. This fact might lower - and possibly eliminate - the states'
motivation to pursue consumers for their taxes owed, though the states'
complicity in taxpayer noncompliance may raise civic concerns. 231
A further difficulty with these actions is that the courts may view them
as simple slights of hand - formalistic actions that have no substantive legal
effect. Under the first set of actions, the taxes collected would be the same
and would presumably continue to be passed along to customers, changing
little in substance. Under the second set of actions, unless the states started
taking action against customers, the substance of the tax burdens would also
remain the same. Therefore, the changes may ultimately prove ineffective in
front of courts determined to allow substance to control the analysis of state
taxes. 232
B. Fundamentally Sound Substantial Nexus
Assuming the Court is convinced to fashion a substantial nexus rule that
better aligns with the Commerce Clause's goal of preventing undue burdens
on interstate commerce, what might that rule look like? This article has
outlined two principles for the Court to follow: jurisdiction to tax standards
under the Commerce Clause should broadly consider the burdens state tax
actions place on interstate commerce and must consider the type of tax
imposed. Recall that there are two primary burdens state tax actions place on
taxpayers engaged interstate commerce: compliance costs and costs of
accessing the tax base. 233 As argued, a taxpayer's physical presence in a state
bears almost no relation to the taxpayer's cost of complying with the state's
tax law; thus, the physical presence rule does little to address the undue
burdens of state tax actions. 234 The physical presence rule is more justifiable
as a proxy for a hard connection between the taxpayer and the activity taxed,
though there is not necessarily any difference in the abilities of a hard
connection regime and a soft connection regime to protect against undue
burdens on interstate commerce. 235 Both regimes ensure the taxpayer has
access to the tax base; a hard connection regime adds additional protection
- perhaps unnecessary in light of National Geographic Society - against
taxation based on extraterritorial activities.236
231 See Holdemess, supra note 144, at 1143-46 (discussing possible ramifications of
complicit nonenforcement of use tax laws by the states for economic development incentives
purposes).
232 See supra note 17.
233 See Part III.B.
234 See Part III.B. I.
235 See Part III.B.2.
236 id
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Taking these observations into account, any substantial nexus rule
should consider the compliance costs associated with the particular tax
imposed as well as the taxpayer's connections with the activity taxed. The
burdens of compliance costs are likely to differ by tax, taxpayer, and industry,
and one can imagine any number of detailed rules to prevent undue burdens.
Many such rules - such as tying undue compliance costs to a percentage of
profit margin - are clearly in the domain of Congress and not the Court.237
Given that the burdens of compliance costs are relatively lower the larger a
taxpayer is, a reasonable rule would be that a taxpayer has a substantial nexus
with a state when the value of the taxpayer's activities relating to the taxed
activity exceeds the compliance costs of the tax by an "appropriate
proportion." 2 38 This rule is vague, as many constitutional rules are, but it
would allow lower tribunals to determine appropriate measures in specific
circumstances and permit a state to reach any taxpayer (that is otherwise
within the state's jurisdiction to tax) by fully bearing the compliance costs of
the taxpayer.239 The limits of "appropriateness" could be established through
further litigation or Congressional action.240 Most importantly, the rule
would target undue burdens on interstate commerce, unlike the physical
presence rule, by using the taxpayer's activities as a proxy for the size of the
taxpayer.
Further, in line with the second principle of this article, the activity taxed
would establish the taxpayer's activities to be considered under the rule.
Flexibility again would be desirable to account for the differences in
activities taxed, so a reasonable approach would be to consider the taxpayer's
activities which are "reasonably related" to the activity taxed.24 1 This would
allow tribunals to determine the types of activities that would ensure a
taxpayer has appropriate access to the tax base depending on what the activity
237 See supra note 63.
238 State and local taxation buffs will recognize this "appropriate proportion" language
from the standard for determining when a state has allocated too much of a multistate tax base
to itself, so as to unduly burden interstate commerce - when the allocation is "out of all
appropriate proportion" to the taxpayer's activity in the state. See Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983) (citing Hans Rees'Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina,
283 U.S. 123 (1931)).
239 See Swain, supra note 4.
240 Cf Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 184 (establishing that the allocation of a tax base
was appropriate when the value of the tax base exceeded the value of the taxpayer's specific
activities in the state by 14%, but not when the proportion was 250%).
241 However, courts have been reluctant to give teeth to the fourth prong of the Complete
Auto test, which requires that the tax be "fairly related to the services provided by the State,"
effectively rendering the prong worthless as a check on state actions. See Zelinsky & Denning,
supra note 152. A "reasonably related" test may also prove toothless if experience with the
forth prong is any guide.
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taxed is.242 In the case of a use tax, all activities relating to the use or
consumption of the product, including perhaps advertising and delivery,
could be considered; in the case of an income tax, things such as the use of
intangible property or franchising could be considered.243 In a soft
connection regime, all of the taxpayer's activities could be considered; under
a hard connection regime, only the in-state activities reasonably related to the
activity taxed would be considered. Under these proposed rules, the danger
of extraterritorial taxation presented by a soft connection regime appears to
loom large, so a hard connection regime may be the better option.
These proposed rules are offered only as a suggestion of a way to
promote the Commerce Clause's goal of preventing undue burdens on
interstate commerce in a more fundamentally sound way than the physical
presence rule currently does. The Court's ultimate decisions in the Wayfair
case or other Kill Quill cases may go in a number of directions. But if the
Court retains the physical presence rule, it should at least admit that the rule
does little to target undue burdens on interstate commerce in a principled
way. Doing so may even offer Congress additional motivation to address the
rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Kill Quill movement has put great effort into placing Quill and the
physical presence rule before the Supreme Court. 244 Now that the movement
has been successful on that front,245 presenting the Court with a number of
reasons why the physical presence rule is improper should increase the
movement's chances of succeeding in having the rule be discarded. This
article has argued that any attack on the physical presence rule should
highlight certain weaknesses in the reasoning behind the rule, specifically the
analytical gaps both with respect to the basis for the substantial nexus
required under the Commerce Clause between the taxing state and the
taxpayer and with respect to the substance of use tax collection obligations.
Two principles for crafting a better approach to jurisdiction to tax rules
emerge from examining these weaknesses in depth: first, the rules should
broadly consider the burdens state tax actions place on interstate commerce,
and second, the rules should take into account the type of tax to be imposed.
The Supreme Court may ultimately fall back on the Quill justification of
242 See supra note 104.
243 See Geoffrey Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993); KFC Corp. v.
Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010).
244 See supra notes 12, 13; Brief of Interested Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner in Brohl v. Direct Marketing Ass'n, at 19 (U.S. Supreme Court, filed Nov. 4, 2016)
(advocating for the Supreme Court to reconsider Quill).
245 See supra note 8.
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the physical presence rule as clearly establishing the line of legitimate state
tax authority and thereby reducing litigation. 246 This would be a
disappointing result; as the states' efforts and Kill Quill litigation have
shown,247 the physical presence rule is not as clear or as litigation-reducing
as the Quill Court may have expected. If the Court is convinced to move past
such base justifications then pressing the Court on the reasoning behind the
rule may at least lead to a better understanding of the purpose of the rule.
Combined with the changing technological and economic circumstances that
increasingly exacerbate the shortcomings of the physical presence rule, an
attack on the reasoning behind the rule may even lead to the realization of the
Kill Quill movement's goal of eliminating the rule. If so, former Alabama
Revenue Commissioner Magee could lead less macabre cheers in the future.
246 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
247 See authorities cited supra note 6; see also Holderness, supra note 38 (detailing the
Kill Quill efforts and cases).
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